In Great Power Rivalry Across Eurasia, An Opening For India

Russian President Vladimir Putin visit to North Korea and Taiwan last week and this week’s presidential debate in the US between incumbent Joe Biden and challenger Donald Trump highlight the complex and deepening interconnections between European and Asian security that offer new strategic opportunities for middle powers like India.

Amid Great Power Rivalry Across Eurasia, An Opportunity Emerges for India

Four dimensions of the new “Eurasian” geopolitics stand out. For one, Asia is no longer a passive adjunct to the European theatre; it actively contributes to the geopolitics of Europe. 

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• During the colonial era, Asian resources were critical in shaping the economic and  geopolitical destinies of the European imperial powers. 
• Recall the large contribution of Indian military resources in reinforcing the primacy of Great Britain in the Indian Ocean from the early 19th century to the mid-20th century. 
• Even more important, Indian armed forces made major contributions to the military success of Britain and its Western allies in the First and Second World Wars. 
• One million Indian soldiers participated in the First and two million in the Second.
• Unlike in the imperial era, when the decisions on using colonial resources were made in the European chancelleries, the Asian states are now able to make choices that shape the balance of power in Europe. 
• Note how both Russia and Western Europe are courting Asia in shaping the narrative on the war in Ukraine. 
• The Ukraine peace conference last month was a major attempt by Kyiv and its Western backers to win political empathy and diplomatic support from the non-Western world in reversing the Russian occupation. 
• Moscow, in turn, pressed key nations of the Global South to avoid attending the conference.
• Conference diplomacy and the mobilisation of non-Western public opinion have indeed become important in the first major war in Europe since the Second World War. 
• Even more important is the fact that Asia has now emerged as a major supplier of arms in a European conflict.
• Consider the Korean Peninsula’s new role in Ukraine. 
• While North Korea has become a major supplier of ammunition to Russia, South Korean arms have been flowing towards Ukraine. 
• While China is not said to be sending arms to Russia, it is supporting Moscow’s war effort in other ways. 
• Washington is pressing Tokyo to ramp up joint production of missiles and liberalise the export controls so that arms made in Japan can flow towards Ukraine and other zones of contest.
• Two, the Asian agency in dealing with great powers has grown in the current conflict. 
• No better evidence than Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and Hanoi. 
• Moscow had stepped back from its intensive partnership with Pyongyang after the end of the Cold War and focused on improving ties with Seoul which has emerged as an economic power. 
• Russia is now eager to rebuild ties with the North. 
• Putin travelled to North Korea last week, for the first time in 24 years, and signed a treaty on mutual security assistance and several other agreements to boost Kim Jong-un.
• You could certainly argue that Putin has played the “North Korea Card” to challenge the West.
• You could assert with equal veracity that Kim Jong-un has played the “Russia Card” to vastly improve his room for manoeuvre between China, Japan, South Korea, and the US. 
• This, in turn, is likely to result in South Korea becoming an even more important partner for the US and Europe. 
• If Russia helps North Korea to boost its nuclear arsenal, the resistance in the US to visualising a nuclear-armed South Korea is likely to diminish.
• In the last couple of years, the Biden Administration has focused on strengthening the bilateral alliance with South Korea and has developed a new trilateral arrangement with Seoul and Tokyo. 
• China, meanwhile, has revived its own trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
• Asia’s agency is also visible in Vietnam’s decision to host President Putin. 
• Vietnam is the only country that has hosted Joe Biden, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on bilateral visits over the last nine months. 
• Vietnam is already in a high-wire strategic act as it simultaneously expands its economic ties with China and the US and explores security cooperation with Washington. 
• Hanoi is betting that renewing strategic ties with Russia improves Vietnam’s balancing act between China and the US.
• Three, as Asian manoeuvrability increases, Western dilemmas are sharpening. 
• One of the major fault lines in the American debate on foreign policy is squaring the competing imperatives in Europe and Asia. (The political divisions on the question of American support to Israel appear less salient).
• After the Second World War, the US-dominated both European and Asian theatres. 
• Thanks to the Russia-China alliance unveiled just days before Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and the scale of the challenge presented by the two powers in Europe and Asia, America is under some pressure to define the source of its primary challenge.
• An important section of the Republican foreign policy establishment argues that the US should not waste its energies on the Ukraine war and concentrate its military power in Asia.
• The Biden Administration agrees that China is the principal challenge but is not in a position to disentangle itself from supporting Ukraine. 
• The arguments on this question might be heard in the debate between Trump and Biden this week.
• Four, the real answer to the question lies in Europe taking a larger responsibility for its own defence — a principle that both Biden and Trump agree on. 
• In other words, Washington wants the Eurasian nations to do more to balance Russia and China and relieve some of America’s burdens. 
• While Europe is struggling to get its defence act together, many Asian states, including Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea are willing to contribute a lot more to the reconstruction of the regional security order.
• Europe is utterly anxious about Russia but divided on how to deal with China. 
• Europe does not see eye-to-eye with the US on the best strategic responses to the China challenge. 
• Although Europe is wary about Chinese support for Russia, it also hopes that Beijing can be persuaded to restrain Moscow. 
• Deep economic interconnections developed over the last four decades between Europe and China’s industrial heartland on the eastern edge of Eurasia make its leaders hesitant in confronting Beijing.
• Yet, Europe can’t ignore the US calls to stand firm against the growing assertion of China in Asia and contribute to the Indo-Pacific security. 
• Washington on its part is also encouraging its close Asian allies —Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea — to contribute to European security
• The great churn triggered by the growing interdependence of the European and Asian theatres is accompanied by the rise of middle powers whose influence is growing across Eurasia. 
• The US is eager to build strong security partnerships with the middle powers to balance China and Russia. 
• The new American emphasis on “integrated deterrence” gives the middle powers like India an unprecedented opportunity to enhance their comprehensive national power, including military capabilities.
• This strategic window is unlikely to last forever. 
• The question is whether the Indian bureaucracy can move fast enough to seize the current international possibilities for the urgent modernisation of India’s defence industrial base and the rapid expansion of arms production at home.
• Self-sufficiency in arms production, after all, is the essence of the muchvaunted “strategic autonomy”.

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Conclusion

Amid the Eurasian power rivalry, India’s strategic opportunities grow, emphasizing the need for swift modernization of its defense industry to achieve strategic autonomy.