{"id":161591,"date":"2025-04-09T20:25:43","date_gmt":"2025-04-09T14:55:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/?post_type=current-affairs&#038;p=161591"},"modified":"2025-04-09T20:25:43","modified_gmt":"2025-04-09T14:55:43","slug":"time-limits-for-governors-to-act-on-bills","status":"publish","type":"current-affairs","link":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/current-affairs\/time-limits-for-governors-to-act-on-bills","title":{"rendered":"SC Prescribes Time Limits For Governors To Act On Bills"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Recently, the Supreme Court prescribed time limits for Governors to act on Bills.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Supreme Court<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> invoked its <\/span><b>extraordinary powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> under <\/span><b>Article 142<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This power, used sparingly, allows the Court to do <\/span><b>&#8220;complete justice&#8221;<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> when other remedies are unavailable.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Court\u2019s decision to exercise this power reflects its <\/span><b>displeasure<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> with the Governor\u2019s actions, particularly the <\/span><b>long delay<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in granting assent.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Background of the Case<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Tamil Nadu Governor R. N. Ravi<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> withholding assent to <\/span><b>10 Bills<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> passed by the <\/span><b>Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Tamil Nadu government<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, led by <\/span><b>DMK<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, challenged this in the <\/span><b>Supreme Court<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in <\/span><b>2023<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, accusing the Governor of political interference and delaying governance.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The governor delayed assent for several months, using his discretionary powers under <\/span><b>Article 200<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Tamil Nadu government argued this amounted to a <\/span><b>&#8220;pocket veto&#8221;<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, preventing the effective functioning of the elected government.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"vc_table_green\"><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 99.7983%;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th style=\"width: 100%; border-style: solid; border-color: #000000; background-color: rgba(184, 165, 217, 0.53); text-align: left; vertical-align: middle;\">\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt; color: #000000;\"><b>Types of Veto Power of the Governor<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Absolute Veto<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The Governor has the power to <\/span><b>withhold assent to a Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> altogether, thereby <\/span><b>rejecting the Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Suspensive Veto<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The Governor may <\/span><b>return the Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (except for Money Bills) to the legislature with a <\/span><b>request for reconsideration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Pocket Veto<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: This occurs when the Governor <\/span><b>withholds assent to a Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for an <\/span><b>indefinite period<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, effectively <\/span><b>delaying<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> or <\/span><b>sitting on the Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> without taking any action.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><\/div>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Key Highlights of the Supreme Court Judgment on the Tamil Nadu Governor&#8217;s Role<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Governor\u2019s Discretionary Power: The Governor must act on the aid and advice<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the state\u2019s <\/span><b>Council of Ministers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, as per <\/span><b>Article 163<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the Constitution.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Except for specific cases under the second proviso to Article 200 and matters like Articles 31, 32, etc.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>The governor cannot exercise absolute or pocket veto<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He must either assent to a Bill, withhold assent, or reserve it for the President, and this decision must be made promptly.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Time Limits Imposed on the Governor: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Court <\/span><b>prescribed strict time limits<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for the Governor\u2019s actions regarding Bills:<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>One month<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for granting assent or reserving the Bill for the President.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>Three months<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for withholding assent when acting contrary to the advice of the state Cabinet.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>One month<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for granting assent after a Bill is re-passed by the legislature after reconsideration.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Governor\u2019s Inaction and Pocket Veto: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Court made it clear that the <\/span><b>Governor cannot delay or withhold assent indefinitely<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The phrase <\/span><b>&#8220;as soon as possible&#8221;<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in <\/span><b>Article 200<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> should not be treated loosely or allow for prolonged delays, as such delays undermine the functioning of the state legislature and the elected government.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Judicial Review of Governor\u2019s Actions: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>actions of the Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> regarding assent to Bills are <\/span><b>subject to judicial review<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If the Governor\u2019s actions are found to be<\/span><b> arbitrary or contrary to constitutional principles<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, courts have the authority to intervene.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Role of the Governor as a Constitutional Head: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Supreme Court underscored that the Governor\u2019s role is to act as a <\/span><b>\u201cfriend, philosopher, and guide\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to the government, not as a <\/span><b>political agent<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor must respect the principles of <\/span><b>parliamentary democracy<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, uphold the will of the people, and not obstruct the elected government\u2019s functioning.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Governors must <\/span><b>facilitate governance<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and avoid actions that create political roadblocks or delay the legislative process.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Governor\u2019s Power to Reserve Bills for President: Governor must reserve Bills for the President\u2019s consideration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> only in exceptional circumstances, such as when a Bill could endanger the powers of the High Court.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor cannot refer the same Bill to the President after it has been <\/span><b>re-passed<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> by the legislature unless it is <\/span><b>substantially different<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Action on Pending Bills: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Court declared that the <\/span><b>10 Bills pending with the Tamil Nadu Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> were effectively <\/span><b>assented to<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> due to the prolonged delay.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Court invoked <\/span><b>Article 142<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the Constitution to ensure <\/span><b>complete justice<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, directing that these Bills be treated as law, given the undue delay in action.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"vc_table_green\"><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 99.7997%;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th style=\"width: 100%; border-style: solid; border-color: #000000; background-color: rgba(184, 165, 217, 0.53); text-align: left; vertical-align: middle;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Dr. B.R. Ambedkar<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: <\/span><b>\u201cHowever good a constitution may be, if those who are implementing it are not good, it will prove to be bad.\u201d<\/b><\/span><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><\/div>\n<div class=\"vc_table_green\"><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 99.6981%;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th style=\"width: 100%; border-style: solid; border-color: #000000; background-color: rgba(184, 165, 217, 0.53); text-align: left; vertical-align: middle;\">\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt; color: #000000;\"><b>Historical Background of the Governor\u2019s Role<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>British Colonial Legacy and Pre-Independence Role: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Under <\/span><b>British rule<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the office of the <\/span><b>Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in India was essentially an agent of the <\/span><b>British Crown<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, with significant administrative powers.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> was responsible for the governance of provinces, functioning under the <\/span><b>Governor-General<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and operated under the guidance of the British authority.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Post-Independence Changes: After independence<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, with the <\/span><b>Government of India Act 1935<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> serving as the basis for the new Constitution, the <\/span><b>Governor&#8217;s role<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> was redefined.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> became the <\/span><b>head of each state<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, but unlike the colonial period, he was now meant to function under the <\/span><b>advice of the state\u2019s Council of Ministers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (Article 163).<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Constitution made the <\/span><b>Governor\u2019s powers more symbolic<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, retaining limited <\/span><b>discretionary powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> in cases of emergency or political instability (Articles 163-200).<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>The Role Under the Constitution of India (1950): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Constitution<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> introduced the <\/span><b>Governor as a nominal head<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the state, where the <\/span><b>real executive power<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> was vested in the <\/span><b>Council of Ministers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> headed by the <\/span><b>Chief Minister<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">While the Governor&#8217;s role was primarily <\/span><b>ceremonial<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, he retained certain powers such as <\/span><b>granting assent to Bills<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><b>calling sessions of the legislature<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Emergence of Tensions Post-1967 Elections: After the 1967 general elections<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, where <\/span><b>regional and opposition parties<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> began gaining power, the role of the <\/span><b>Governor became more contentious<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The growing <\/span><b>political fragmentation<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> required Governors to use their <\/span><b>discretionary powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> more frequently, particularly in cases of government formation, dismissal, and the use of <\/span><b>President\u2019s Rule<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (Article 356).<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><\/div>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Constitutional Provisions Related to the Governor\u2019s Role<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 153 &#8211; Governor of a State: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Every State in India shall have a <\/span><b>Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor is appointed by the <\/span><b>President of India<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and holds office during the President&#8217;s pleasure.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 154: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>executive power of the State<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> is vested in the Governor, who exercises it directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-161571 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/92-67f682a7b0900.webp\" alt=\"Time Limits For Governors\" width=\"448\" height=\"299\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/92-67f682a7b0900.webp 682w, https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/92-67f682a7b0900-300x200.webp 300w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 448px) 100vw, 448px\" \/><b>Article 163 (Council of Ministers): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor shall exercise his functions with the <\/span><b>aid and advice<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the <\/span><b>Council of Ministers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> headed by the Chief Minister, except in cases where he is required by the Constitution to act in his discretion.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>Article 163(2) &#8211; Governor\u2019s Discretion: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In case of a dispute regarding whether the Governor is required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor is <\/span><b>final<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 164 (Appointment of Chief Minister and Council of Ministers): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor is responsible for <\/span><b>appointing the Chief Minister<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and other Ministers. The Council of Ministers remains in office during the pleasure of the Governor.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 167 (Duties of the Chief Minister): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Chief Minister is required to communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Council of Ministers, proposals for legislation, and other information related to State administration.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 200 &#8211; Assent to Bills: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">When a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, it is presented to the Governor for assent.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor has<\/span><b> four options:<\/b>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"3\"><b>Grant assent<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to the Bill.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"3\"><b>Withhold assent<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to the Bill.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"3\"><b>Return the Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for reconsideration by the Legislature (except Money Bills).<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"3\"><b>Reserve the Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for the President&#8217;s consideration.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor must act on the Bill <\/span><b>&#8220;as soon as possible&#8221;<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"3\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If a Bill is returned and re-passed by the Legislature, the Governor <\/span><b>must assent<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to it unless the Bill has changed substantially.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 361 (Protection of the Governor): P<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">rovides <\/span><b>immunity<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to the Governor, stating that no proceedings can be initiated against him in court for anything done or omitted in the exercise of his powers.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 356 &#8211; President\u2019s Rule: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Governor can report to the <\/span><b>President<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> under <\/span><b>Article 356<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> if the government in a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Article 200 &#8211; Reservation of Bills for President: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If a Bill passed by the State Legislature threatens the <\/span><b>powers of the High Court<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> or raises a matter of constitutional importance, the <\/span><b>Governor may reserve the Bill for the President\u2019s consideration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> under this provision.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Reasons for Delayed Assent by Governors\u00a0<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Political Disagreement with State Government<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: In Opposition-ruled states, Governors\u2014appointed by the Union Government\u2014are often accused of stalling state legislative Bills as a <\/span><b>political tactic<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Tamil Nadu<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, Governor R. N. Ravi withheld assent to 10 Bills passed by the DMK-led Assembly, creating legislative deadlock.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Exploitation of Lack of Time Limits in Article 200<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Article 200 uses the phrase \u201cas soon as possible\u201d but does <\/span><b>not specify any deadline<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, enabling Governors to <\/span><b>delay Bills indefinitely<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the <\/span><b>Kerala case<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, 8 Bills were kept pending for <\/span><b>up to 2 years<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Personal Discretion and Misuse of Constitutional Power<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Governors sometimes exercise <\/span><b>discretionary powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> arbitrarily or without adequate constitutional reasoning.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Supreme Court in the <\/span><b>Shamsher Singh (1974)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> case clarified that the Governor must act on the <\/span><b>aid and advice of the Council of Ministers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and that the use of discretion is only in <\/span><b>exceptional, explicitly stated situations<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Strategic Delay to Block State Legislative Agenda: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In some cases, delaying assent appears to be a <\/span><b>deliberate move to obstruct<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> the state government\u2019s policies, particularly <\/span><b>welfare or reform-oriented Bills<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Kerala<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, Bills related to <\/span><b>university reforms<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, <\/span><b>Lokayukta changes<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and the <\/span><b>Public Health Bill, 2021<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> were kept pending for long periods. The SC noted this as <\/span><b>an affront to representative democracy and Article 21<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> rights\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Constitutional or Legal Concerns over Bills<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Sometimes Governors delay assent if they <\/span><b>doubt the legality<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> or <\/span><b>constitutional validity<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the Bill or need more time for examination.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the Kerala case, the <\/span><b>Governor raised objections<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> over the clarity of provisions in the <\/span><b>Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Bill<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and sought clarifications from the Cabinet.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Key Concerns Related to Governors in India<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><b>Delayed Assent to Bills and \u201cPocket Veto\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Governors withholding or sitting on Bills indefinitely undermines the legislative authority of elected state governments.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Tamil Nadu<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><b>Kerala<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, multiple Bills were kept pending for <\/span><b>months to years<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, prompting Supreme Court intervention.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><b>Political Partisanship and Misuse of Office<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Governors are often accused of acting as <\/span><b>agents of the Centre<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, especially in Opposition-ruled states, damaging <\/span><b>federal balance<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Sarkaria Commission (1988)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> observed that many Governors looked forward to future posts under the Union and thus acted <\/span><b>without impartiality<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><b>Lack of Accountability and Removal Mechanism<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Governors enjoy immunity under <\/span><b>Article 361<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and there is <\/span><b>no process for impeachment<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, leading to concerns over lack of accountability.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the SC held that although Governors enjoy immunity, their actions can be reviewed for <\/span><b>constitutional validity<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><b>Interference in Day-to-Day Administration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Governors have increasingly intervened in <\/span><b>executive matters<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, such as university appointments, cabinet decisions, and legislative sessions.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Delhi<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Act 2021 curtailed the Legislative Assembly\u2019s powers, making the <\/span><b>LG&#8217;s opinion mandatory<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for executive actions. The SC in 2023 reaffirmed that the <\/span><b>elected government controls administration<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, not the LG\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><b>Arbitrary Use of Discretionary Powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Discretion under Articles <\/span><b>163<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><b>200<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> is often used <\/span><b>beyond constitutional limits<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, especially during government formation or Bill reservation.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In <\/span><b>Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the SC ruled that the Governor must act on <\/span><b>aid and advice<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and not use discretion except where expressly permitted by the Constitution\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><b>Undermining of Democratic Mandate<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Actions like delay in summoning assemblies, not reading parts of the Governor\u2019s address, or bypassing the CM&#8217;s advice <\/span><b>weaken the state\u2019s democratic setup<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Supreme Court in November 2023<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> emphasized that Governors cannot act in a way that <\/span><b>thwarts lawmaking or disrupts legislative autonomy<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, reaffirming the need to <\/span><b>safeguard parliamentary democracy<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"vc_table_green\"><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 99.698%;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th style=\"width: 100%; border-style: solid; border-color: #000000; background-color: rgba(184, 165, 217, 0.53); text-align: left; vertical-align: middle;\">\n<h3><span style=\"font-size: 16pt; color: #000000;\"><b>Key Commissions Related to the Governor of a State<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Sarkaria Commission (1988): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Sarkaria Commission, headed by Justice R.S. Sarkaria,<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> focused on Centre-State relations and recommended that Governors be <\/span><b>non-partisan<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, preferably from outside the state, and <\/span><b>consulted with the Chief Minister<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> before appointment.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It emphasized that Governors should <\/span><b>not misuse their discretionary powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and should act as a bridge between the Centre and State.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) \u2013 2001: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>NCRWC, headed by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> recommended that Governors should have a <\/span><b>fixed tenure<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and be <\/span><b>non-political<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It stressed that the Governor\u2019s role should be to uphold constitutional values and not to serve political interests, reinforcing the importance of <\/span><b>consultative appointments<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Punchhi Commission (2010): <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>Punchhi Commission, headed by Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> proposed that the Governor\u2019s appointment should involve <\/span><b>consultation with the Chief Minister<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and that the <\/span><b>Governor&#8217;s tenure<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> should be <\/span><b>fixed at five years<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It also called for a <\/span><b>Code of Conduct<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for Governors and recommended limits on the use of <\/span><b>Article 356<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><b>Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) \u2013 1966\u201370: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><b>ARC, headed by Morarji Desai,<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> emphasized the importance of an <\/span><b>independent and non-political Governor<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.\u00a0<\/span><\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It advocated for a <\/span><b>clear framework<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> for Governor-CM relations to ensure the Governor\u2019s role remains above politics and focused on constitutional duties.<\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><\/div>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Way Forward: Reforming the Role of Governors in India<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Prescribe Time Limits for Assent to Bills<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The Constitution should be amended or clarified to prescribe specific time limits within which a Governor must act on Bills passed by the State Legislature.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">SC (2025) invoked Article 142 to mandate time-bound action and prevent \u201cpocket veto\u201d\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Reform the Appointment Process<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The appointment of Governors should involve consultation with the Chief Minister of the concerned state to ensure federal balance and impartiality.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sarkaria Commission (1988)<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Punchhi Commission (2010)<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> recommended that Governors be selected from apolitical backgrounds and with the consent of the state to avoid allegations of bias\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Ensure Security of Tenure and Impartiality: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">To promote independence, Governors should have a fixed tenure and should not be removed arbitrarily by the Central Government.\u00a0<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Punchhi Commission<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> emphasized that arbitrary removal of Governors erodes their neutrality and independence\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Limit Discretionary Powers<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: The Constitution must clearly define the limited circumstances under which the Governor can exercise discretion. The use of such powers should be subject to reasoned explanation and judicial review to prevent misuse.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><b>In Shamsher Singh (1974)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and <\/span><b>Nabam Rebia (2016) case, SC<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> emphasized that discretion is the <\/span><b>exception<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, not the rule\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Create a Mechanism for Grievance Redressal<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: A formal institutional mechanism, such as an Inter-State Council sub-committee or a constitutional ombudsman, should be created to mediate disputes between the Governor and the elected state government.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Enact a Code of Conduct for Governors<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: To maintain constitutional decorum and avoid political controversy.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Parliament may frame a <\/span><b>\u201cGovernor\u2019s Code of Conduct\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, drawing from the <\/span><b>Constitutional Morality doctrine<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> invoked by SC in the <\/span><b>NCT Delhi case (2018)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u200b.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"1\"><b>Consider Impeachment or Censure Provisions<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Presently, Governors enjoy protection under Article 361 and are not answerable to the State Legislature, creating a gap in democratic checks and balances.<\/span>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\" aria-level=\"2\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">To ensure accountability, mechanisms such as legislative censure or even a structured process for removal may be considered.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Conclusion<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The recent Supreme Court\u2019s ruling decisively addressed the Governor\u2019s delay in acting on Bills by prescribing strict time limits and reinforcing constitutional morality. By curbing the misuse of discretionary powers and pocket vetoes, the judgment strengthens parliamentary democracy and federal harmony, setting a precedent for Governors to facilitate, not obstruct, elected state governments.<\/span><\/p>\n<span class=\"vc_button\"><b>Additional Reading: <\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/current-affairs\/appointment-of-governor-in-states\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Appointment of Governor in States<\/b><\/a><\/span>\n<div class=\"vc_table_green\"><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 99.6375%;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 111.19%; text-align: center;\" colspan=\"2\"><span style=\"font-size: 18pt;\"><b>Also Read<\/b><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 49.797%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/editorial-analysis\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>UPSC Daily Editorials<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.393%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/daily-current-affairs\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>UPSC Daily Current Affairs<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 49.797%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/quiz\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Daily Current Affairs Quiz<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.393%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/mains-answer-writing\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Daily Main Answer Writing<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 49.797%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/store.pw.live\/govt-entrance-exams\/upsc-books\/upsc-previous-year-papers?utm_source=SEO&#038;utm_medium=PW+Live&#038;utm_campaign=UPSC+Previous+Year+Papers\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Check Out Previous Years Papers From PW Store<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.393%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/upsc-test-series-courses\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>UPSC Test Series<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 49.797%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/store.pw.live\/govt-entrance-exams\/upsc-books\/upsc-textbooks?utm_source=SEO&#038;utm_medium=PW+Live&#038;utm_campaign=UPSC+Textbooks\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Check Out UPSC NCERT Textbooks From PW Store<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.393%; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/store.pw.live\/govt-entrance-exams\/upsc-books\/upsc-modules?utm_source=SEO&#038;utm_medium=PW+Live&#038;utm_campaign=UPSC+Modules\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><b>Check Out UPSC Modules From PW Store<\/b><\/a><b>\u00a0<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Recently, the Supreme Court prescribed time limits for Governors to act on Bills.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":161574,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"rank_math_lock_modified_date":false,"footnotes":""},"tags":[],"paper-wise":[2084],"subject":[4632,2124],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/current-affairs\/161591"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/current-affairs"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/current-affairs"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=161591"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/current-affairs\/161591\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":161595,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/current-affairs\/161591\/revisions\/161595"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/161574"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=161591"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=161591"},{"taxonomy":"paper-wise","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/paper-wise?post=161591"},{"taxonomy":"subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pwonlyias.com\/stage\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/subject?post=161591"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}