Answer

India’s thermal power sector, essential for energy, is also a significant source of pollution. Thermal power emissions are the harmful gases released during fossil fuel combustion. In the fiscal year 2022-23, India’s thermal power plants emitted over 950 million metric tonnes of CO₂, accounting for approximately one-third of the nation’s total emissions. This highlights the need for effective regulation and collaboration among stakeholders like government, industry, and communities.

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India’s thermal power emission regulation: complex interplay between environmental protection, economic considerations, and governance challenges

• Delays in Implementation: Frequent deadline extensions by the MoEFCC indicate weak regulatory enforcement and policy uncertainty, undermining trust in environmental governance mechanisms.
  For example: The SO₂ emission deadline for 20 GW plants near densely populated areas was postponed to 2027, despite earlier commitments for 2024.
• Misalignment of Environment and Technology: The debate wrongly centered around implementing flue gas desulphurisation(FGDs), which were not mandated, instead of leveraging low-sulfur Indian coal to meet SO₂ norms more cost-effectively.
  For example: Studies commissioned by the Central electricity commission and NITI Aayog questioned the efficacy of SO₂ norms, delaying consensus on sustainable emission control solutions.
• Economic Burden on Consumers: Consumers are forced to bear the financial burden of unused pollution control equipment, with no immediate improvement in air quality or reduced emissions.
  For example: Nearly 22 GW of plants installed FGDs but are unlikely to use them due to operational cost concerns and extended deadlines for compliance.
• Fragmented Deadlines: Multiple deadlines for different pollutants across plant locations have created administrative complexity, reducing the efficiency of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
  For example: The final deadline for particulate matter was December 2024, yet SO₂ norms were delayed until 2027, leading to inconsistent pollution control efforts.
• Conflict Between Public Health and Industrial Costs: Stringent SO₂ emission norms aim to reduce public health risks, but their enforcement imposes high compliance costs on thermal power plants, creating an economic conflict.
  For example: The installation of FGDs increased operational costs, leading to higher electricity tariffs for consumers, as mandated by electricity regulators.

Role of Various Stakeholders in the Saga

• Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC): The MoEFCC played a key role in drafting norms but weakened its credibility by diluting standards and repeatedly extending deadlines.
  For example: The December 2024 notification was the fourth extension for SO₂ norms, undermining environmental commitments made in 2015.
• Central Electricity Authority (CEA): The CEA influenced the discourse by questioning uniform norms, proposing phased implementation, and commissioning studies, delaying consensus on emission control strategies.
  For example: In 2022, the CEA’s study by IIT Delhi cited high FGD costs and increased coal consumption as reasons to delay SO₂ norm compliance.
• NITI Aayog and Research Institutes: NITI Aayog commissioned studies that questioned the importance of SO₂ norms, adding to the confusion and weakening environmental priorities.
  For example: CSIR-NEERI’s 2024 study emphasized on particulate emissions (PM particles) over SO₂, challenging the broader objectives of emission regulations.
• Electricity Regulators and Thermal Power Plants: Regulators allowed cost pass-throughs for FGD installations, while plants prioritized financial interests over environmental compliance due to weak enforcement.
  For example: Despite over 50% of plants nearing FGD installation, operators may not use them to avoid higher generation costs, prioritizing profits.
• Civil Society and Local Communities: Communities living near plants continue to face health hazards due to delayed compliance, highlighting the lack of public accountability mechanisms.
  For example: Residents near thermal plants in densely populated regions like Singrauli face long-term exposure to SO₂ emissions despite regulatory norms.

Challenges in Regulating India’s Thermal Power Emissions

• Weak Policy Enforcement: Repeated extensions for emission norms signal weak regulatory enforcement and a lack of accountability, undermining progress toward environmental goals.
• High Cost of Compliance: Installing and operating FGDs increases costs, discouraging plants from prioritizing compliance and creating economic pressure on the sector.
  For example: The IIT Delhi study commissioned by the CEA highlighted FGDs’ high installation costs and operational expenses as major challenges.
• Misaligned Focus on Norms: The debate centered around implementing FGDs instead of exploring alternative, cost-effective methods tailored to low-sulfur Indian coal.
  For example: Despite SO₂ norms not mandating FGDs, most discussions and installations revolved around this technology, ignoring simpler solutions.
• Lack of Stakeholder Consensus: Diverging viewpoints among the MoEFCC, CEA, and NITI Aayog have created confusion and delayed unified action to address emission concerns.
  For example: While the MoEFCC pushed for SO₂ norms, NITI Aayog and CSIR-NEERI studies downplayed their importance, advocating a focus on particulate matter.
• Economic Burden on Consumers: Passing FGD costs to consumers without operational benefits has increased electricity bills while failing to improve air quality for nearby communities.
  For example: Consumers are paying for installed FGDs, but plants may not run them due to increased generation costs, as seen with the extended 2027 compliance deadline.

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Balanced Approach to Achieve Environmental and Developmental Goals

• Time-Bound Enforcement: Strict deadlines for emission compliance, monitored through transparent and publicly accessible mechanisms, can ensure timely implementation.
  For instance: A publicly available tracking system for FGD installations and operational status could enhance accountability and enforcement.
• Incentivizing Compliance: Providing subsidies or low-interest loans for emission control technology can reduce financial pressure on thermal plants while encouraging early adoption.
  For instance: The government could offer tax benefits for thermal plants that comply with SO₂ norms ahead of schedule.
• Promoting Research and Innovation: Investing in indigenous technologies suited to Indian coal’s low sulfur content can reduce dependence on costly FGDs.
  For instance: Developing in-house flue gas treatment technologies tailored to Indian coal can lower compliance costs and operational barriers.
• Stakeholder Coordination and Consensus Building: A unified approach among stakeholders—MoEFCC, CEA, NITI Aayog, and local communities—can streamline policies and prevent conflicting narratives.
  For example: A collaborative task force involving all stakeholders could align environmental and economic priorities for emission control.
• Phased Compliance with Regional Prioritization: Implementing stricter norms for plants near densely populated areas while providing extended timelines for less critical regions can balance public health and economic goals.
  For example: Prioritizing emission controls for plants in high-pollution zones like Singrauli can deliver immediate benefits while allowing phased compliance elsewhere.

Achieving sustainable development in India’s thermal power sector requires collaborative action among government bodies, industry leaders, and civil society. By enforcing stringent emission standards, investing in cleaner technologies, and promoting public awareness, India can harmonize economic growth with environmental stewardship.

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