Core Demand of the Question
- Discuss how the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356 has evolved from a tool of constitutional necessity to a politically contentious provision.
- Examine its impact on Centre-State relations with reference to judicial interventions and recent instances.
- Suggest a way forward
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Answer
Article 356 empowers the President to impose President’s Rule in a state when constitutional machinery collapses. While the S.R. Bommai (1994) verdict restricted its misuse, recent instances like Maharashtra (2019) and Manipur (2025), highlight its political contentiousness. These cases underscore ongoing tensions in Centre-State relations and the role of judicial scrutiny.
Evolution from a Constitutional Necessity to a Politically Contentious Provision
- Constitutional Safeguard Against Breakdown: Originally, Article 356 was intended as a safeguard against constitutional breakdown in states, ensuring governance in case of failure of law and order or political instability.
For example: In 1951, President’s Rule was first imposed in Punjab after Chief Minister Gopi Chand Bhargava resigned due to internal Congress party conflicts.
- Misuse for Political Gains: Over time, the provision became a tool for the Centre to dismiss state governments controlled by opposition parties, undermining federal principles.
For example: In 1977, the Janata Party dismissed nine Congress-led state governments after winning the general elections, citing loss of public mandate.
- Frequent Use Before Judicial Oversight : Before judicial scrutiny, President’s Rule was frequently used, with 100 instances between 1950 and 1994, averaging 2.5 times per year.
For example: In 1980, Indira Gandhi dismissed nine opposition-led governments, mirroring what had happened to Congress governments in 1977.
- Bommai Judgment and Judicial Checks: The 1994 S.R.Bommai case imposed judicial limitations, allowing courts to review the imposition of President’s Rule, reducing arbitrary dismissals.
For example: The Supreme Court reinstated the Karnataka government in 1989, ruling that the dismissal was politically motivated and unconstitutional.
- Reduced Use Post-1994: After judicial checks, its usage declined, with only 30 instances since 1994 compared to 100 before, reducing Centre’s unchecked power over states.
For example: In 2016, President’s Rule was revoked in Uttarakhand after the Supreme Court intervened, restoring the Congress government.
Impact on Centre-State Relations
- Weakening Federal Autonomy: The excessive use of Article 356 undermines federalism, allowing the Centre to control states, reducing their autonomy.
For example: In Gujarat (1974), Karnataka (1990), and Manipur (2025), President’s Rule was imposed despite the ruling party having a majority.
- Political Tensions and Trust Deficit: Imposing President’s Rule creates tensions between the Centre and states, leading to political distrust and allegations of misuse.
For example: The 2019 J&K reorganization under President’s Rule was heavily criticized as a unilateral decision affecting state rights.
- Suspended Animation Raises Constitutional Concerns: Keeping assemblies in suspended animation instead of dissolving them raises concerns about Centre’s intentions to manipulate political outcomes.
For example: Manipur’s assembly remains in suspended animation (2025), despite the ruling BJP having a majority, questioning the Centre’s motives.
- Use in Opposition-Led States: President’s Rule is often imposed in opposition-led states, reflecting a pattern of political bias rather than genuine governance failure.
For example: In Uttarakhand (2016), the Centre dismissed the Congress government, but the Supreme Court later reinstated it, calling the move unjustified.
Way Forward
- Strict Judicial Oversight: The judiciary should ensure Article 356 is used only in extreme circumstances, preventing political misuse.
For example: The 2016 Uttarakhand case showed how judicial intervention can prevent Centre’s arbitrary interference in state governance.
- Clear Guidelines for Imposition: There should be well-defined conditions for imposing President’s Rule, reducing its discretionary misuse by the Centre.
For example: The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended using it only as a last resort, but its recommendations remain partially implemented.
- Parliamentary Approval Mechanism: Stronger parliamentary scrutiny before approving President’s Rule can prevent misuse and encourage debate on necessity.
For example: According to the Punchhi Commission, any such emergency should last no longer than three months.
- Empowering State Institutions: Strengthening state institutions, governance frameworks, and cooperative federalism can reduce Centre’s need to invoke Article 356.
For example: If local law enforcement and governance are robust, law-and-order situations (as in Manipur) can be managed without central intervention.
- Alternatives to President’s Rule: Instead of dismissing state governments, alternatives like judicial mediation, central advisory committees, or emergency support mechanisms should be explored.
For example: Advisory panels during governance crises (as suggested for Manipur) could help resolve conflicts without suspending democratic processes.
Advancing federalism with enhanced judicial oversight and proactive constitutional reforms can convert Article 356 into a mechanism for strengthening Centre-State synergy. Prioritizing transparent dialogue and accountability fosters resilient governance. Smart reforms, strong future— empowering democratic values and setting a sustainable course for India’s vibrant federal landscape. Driving inclusive progress and change.
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