Answer

Introduction

The Indian Constitution, under Article 1, envisages India as a “Union of States”, a federal polity with unitary bias, carefully balancing Centre–State powers. Articles 245–263 establish this division of authority, while B.R. Ambedkar emphasised that “States are not mere appendages of the Centre.” However, recent trends of centralisation, political misuse of constitutional offices, and erosion of cooperative federalism threaten this equilibrium.

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Challenges of Growing Centralisation of Authority

• Erosion of State Autonomy through Electoral Reforms: Synchronising Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections risks truncating terms of legislatures, undermining their electoral sovereignty.
  Eg: The “One Nation, One Election” proposal may cut short State Assembly mandates mid-term.
• Expanding Central Agencies into State Jurisdiction: Frequent intervention by ED, CBI and other agencies encroaches on matters constitutionally reserved for States.
• Fiscal Centralisation and Dependency: Post-GST reforms have curtailed States’ revenue autonomy, deepening their dependence on Union transfers and limiting welfare spending.
  Eg: Delays in GST compensation to States during COVID-19 exposed fiscal vulnerability.
• Governor’s Office as a Political Tool: Governors increasingly act as partisan agents, withholding Bills and intruding into administration beyond constitutional limits.
  Eg: Kerala and Tamil Nadu Governors stalled State Bills for months, violating Article 200’s mandate.
• Policy Uniformity Undermining Diversity: Centrally designed schemes impose a one-size-fits-all model, ignoring regional priorities in education, agriculture, and welfare.
  Eg: Implementation of National Education Policy without adequate State consultation has drawn criticism.
• Weakening Federal Institutions of Dialogue: Institutions meant for cooperative federalism, like the Inter-State Council, remain underutilised, reducing space for consensus-building.
  Eg: The Inter-State Council has met infrequently despite Article 263’s intent for regular Centre–State dialogue.

Implications for State Autonomy

• Curtailment of Legislative Authority: Governors withholding assent or sitting indefinitely on Bills undermines the legislative sovereignty of elected State Assemblies.
• Erosion of Academic Autonomy: Central control and gubernatorial delays in approving university appointments weaken States’ authority over higher education institutions.
  Eg: West Bengal and Kerala faced prolonged delays in Vice-Chancellor appointments due to Governor-led disputes.
• Fiscal Dependence Limiting Welfare Role: With shrinking revenue powers post-GST and reliance on Union transfers, States struggle to fund welfare measures against poverty and malnutrition.
• Undermining of Popular Mandates: Central interventions through agencies, Governor’s office, or Article 356 dilute the electoral mandate of State governments.
  Eg: The 2016 Arunachal Pradesh crisis saw an elected government dismissed, later overturned in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker Case.
• Shift from Cooperative to Competitive Centralism: Instead of genuine partnership, Centre–State relations are increasingly marked by unilateral directives, eroding federal trust.
  Eg: Centrally dictated farm laws (2020) were passed without wide State consultation, triggering massive protests.
• Rising Regional Alienation: Perceived overreach by the Union fosters regional discontent, threatening India’s unity in diversity and federal balance.

Suggestive Measures to Safeguard Federalism

• Codify limits on Governor’s discretion: Governor’s discretionary powers often undermine elected State governments; clearer codification can prevent arbitrary misuse.
  Eg: As per Punchhi Commission (2010) and Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia (2016), the Governor must act only on Cabinet advice.
• Strengthen Inter-State Council (Art. 263): The Council remains underutilised despite being a key constitutional forum for Centre–State dialogue; regularisation can ease friction.
  Eg: Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended activating it for continuous consultation between Union and States.
• Reinforce fiscal federalism: Fiscal centralisation curtails States’ developmental space; strengthening devolution and stabilising GST support is vital.
  Eg: Implement Finance Commission’s formula transparently and widen GST compensation window for States.
• Ensure institutional independence: Neutral institutions are necessary to balance power; shielding them from partisan influence safeguards federal trust.
  Eg: Protect ECI, CAG, ED from capture, echoing Kesavananda Bharati (1973) “basic structure” doctrine.
• Judicial oversight on Centre–State conflicts: Judiciary must actively arbitrate disputes to ensure federal balance and prevent executive overreach.
• Promote pluralism & tolerance: Federalism thrives on cultural and political pluralism; protecting dissent strengthens democratic diversity.
  Eg: Uphold Article 19(1)(a) rights by treating dissent as democratic duty, not anti-national activity.
• Strengthen cooperative forums like GST Council: Decision-making in shared institutions should favour consensus, not majoritarian dominance.
  Eg: GST Council can adopt consensus-based voting to reinforce cooperative spirit of federalism.

Conclusion

India’s federal democracy was envisioned as a Union of equal partners, bound by cooperation, not coercion. Recent trends of centralisation and politicisation of constitutional offices risk undermining that spirit. Safeguarding State autonomy requires recommitting to constitutional morality, activating institutions like the Inter-State Council, ensuring independent offices, and embracing pluralism. If pursued with sincerity, this can restore the nationalist legacy of inclusivity and dignity, ensuring a vibrant and resilient Republic for generations.

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