Recently the Union Government cautioned the Supreme Court against judicial overreach in prescribing timelines for Governors and the President to act on State Bills.

Background of the Case

• Supreme Court Ruling (April 8, 2025): A two-judge bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan ruled that Governors must decide on Bills within a fixed time and cannot exercise discretion against the aid and advice of the State Cabinet.
• Deemed Assent Provision: The Court invoked Article 142 to grant ‘deemed assent’ to delayed Bills and also directed the President to decide within three months on Bills referred to her by Governors.
• Presidential Reference (May 2025): Following the judgment, President Droupadi Murmu referred 14 questions to a five-judge Constitution Bench under Article 143 (advisory jurisdiction), questioning whether such timelines could be imposed on constitutional authorities.

Key Concerns Raised by Government

• Violation of Separation of Powers: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta argued that timelines imposed by the judiciary effectively amend the Constitution and disturb the balance among the executive, legislature, and judiciary.
• Non-Justiciable Nature of Assent: The Centre underlined that gubernatorial assent under Article 200 and Presidential assent under Article 201 are plenary and non-justiciable powers, immune from judicial interference.
• Governors as National Representatives: The submission stressed that Governors are not “aliens” but representatives of national democratic will, appointed by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
• Dual Nature of Assent: Gubernatorial assent has a dual nature, though an executive act, it is legislative in outcome.
  • Therefore, judicially imposed timelines could distort the legislative process.
• Absence of Express Time Limits: The absence of timelines in Articles 200 and 201 reflects a deliberate constitutional choice. Judicial creation of time-bound procedures amounts to a constitutional amendment outside Parliament’s authority.

About Separation of Powers

• The doctrine of separation of powers ensures that the legislature, executive, and judiciary function within their own spheres, preventing concentration of power in any single organ.
• Constitutional Provision: Although the Constitution of India does not expressly provide for separation of powers, Articles 50, 121, 122, 211, and 212 establish boundaries for institutional functioning.
  • For Example Article 50 mandates the state to separate the judiciary from the executive branch in public services.
• Judicial Recognition as Basic Structure: In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Supreme Court held that separation of powers is part of the basic structure doctrine, immune from amendment.
• Separation is not water tight: While checks and balances exist, there are exclusive constitutional zones reserved for each organ, and judicial encroachment into executive discretion b risks upsetting this equilibrium.

Judicial Review, Activism and Overreach

Recent Cases of Judicial Overreach

• Tamil Nadu Governor Case (2025): Supreme Court imposed a three-month timeline for Governors and the President on State Bills, creating the concept of ‘deemed assent’ under Article 142.
• National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Case (2015): The Supreme Court struck down the NJAC Act, reviving the collegium system, which many argued was judicial law-making in the absence of explicit provisions.
• Coal Allocation Case (2014): The apex court cancelled over 200 coal block allocations, a policy decision typically within the executive domain, raising concerns about economic disruptions caused by judicial intervention.
• Liquor Ban on Highways (2017) : Supreme Court imposed a nationwide liquor sales ban within 500 metres of highways, a regulatory issue traditionally under legislative and executive competence.

Impact of Judicial Overreach

• Destabilisation of Constitutional Balance: Encroachment into executive discretion alters the equilibrium between organs of the State.
• Policy Paralysis: Excessive intervention in governance decisions risks creating uncertainty in economic and administrative matters.
• Erosion of Democratic Mandate: Judicial rewriting of constitutional provisions reduces the role of elected representatives in decision-making.
• Loss of Institutional Credibility: Frequent overreach may weaken public trust in the judiciary as a neutral arbiter.

Way Forward

• Respect Constitutional Boundaries: The judiciary must exercise restraint and uphold the deliberate silence of the Constitution where no explicit timelines are provided (e.g., Articles 200–201).
• Strengthen Federal Dialogue: Greater executive-legislative consultation between Union, States, and Governors can reduce litigation and clarify the role of gubernatorial assent.
• Judicial Minimalism: Courts should apply the doctrine of judicial minimalism, intervening only to correct manifest illegality, not to legislate or prescribe new procedures.
• Parliamentary Reforms: If time-bound mechanisms for assent are deemed necessary, they must come through constitutional amendment or parliamentary legislation, not judicial directions.

Conclusion

The Centre’s submissions highlight a clash between judicial innovation and constitutional fidelity. By invoking separation of powers and the basic structure doctrine, the government stresses that only Parliament, not courts, can alter the delicate framework governing the President’s and Governors’ powers under Articles 200–201.

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