Recently, Russia’s successful test of the nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile and the U.S. decision to resume nuclear testing after 33 years have reignited fears of a renewed global nuclear arms race, undermining decades of arms control and disarmament progress.

The New Nuclear Race- Russia’s Burevestnik and U.S. Policy Reversal

• Russia’s Technological Breakthrough: The Burevestnik (9M730 “Skyfall”) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile using a miniaturised nuclear reactor for propulsion, capable of low-altitude and unpredictable trajectories, making it difficult to intercept. 
  • Russia claims the missile has an unlimited range, and during a critical test in October 2025, it reportedly flew 14,000 kilometres (8,700 miles) for about 15 hours at altitudes as low as 50 to 100 metres, underscoring its ability to evade radar and missile defence systems.
• U.S. Policy Reversal: The U.S. President’s decision to resume nuclear testing ended a 33-year moratorium, coinciding with his meeting with the Chinese President and increasing global nuclear insecurity.
  • Strategic Impact: This development revived Cold War-style competition as Russia, China, and the United States accelerate nuclear modernisation, undermining the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The erosion of this framework increases the risk of renewed strategic instability.

The Emerging Global Nuclear Order

• Erosion of Post–Cold War Consensus: The long-held moratorium on testing and restraint-based diplomacy is collapsing as nuclear powers innovate new-generation weapons.
• Rise of China’s Arsenal: China’s nuclear stockpile is rapidly expanding. As of early 2024, it possesses an estimated 500–600 operational nuclear warheads, projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030 and potentially reach 1,500 by 2035. 
  • This expansion intensifies the United States–China rivalry, reshaping global deterrence dynamics.
• Technological Multipolarity: Russia’s Burevestnik, China’s DF-41 Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) missile, and the United States’ Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) represent a multi-front technological arms race, signalling a shift toward multipolar nuclear competition.

Factors Leading to a Renewed Global Testing Push

• Technological Modernisation: Major powers are pursuing MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles), hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and miniaturised warheads, which require validation through real-world testing.
  • Russia’s Burevestnik missile and the U.S. plan to resume nuclear testing reflect this trend.
• Erosion of Arms Control Frameworks: Weakening of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and uncertainty over the New START Treaty (expiring 2026) have reduced trust in restraint-based diplomacy.
  • The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) faces credibility erosion due to perceived inequities among nuclear and non-nuclear states.
• Strategic Competition and Deterrence Signalling: The renewed U.S.–Russia–China nuclear rivalry is pushing smaller nuclear powers to reassess their deterrence doctrines.
  • China’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at 500–600 warheads (2024) and projected to reach 1,500 by 2035, fuels this competitive escalation.
• Domestic and Political Motives: Testing is often linked to national prestige, technological self-assertion, and domestic political signalling of strength and independence.

Consequences of Resuming U.S. Nuclear Testing

• Global Level:
  • Breaks Long-standing Moratorium: The U.S. decision ends a 33-year self-imposed moratorium, weakening the informal global restraint that had effectively halted live nuclear detonations since the Cold War.
  • Legitimises Reciprocal Testing: This move could encourage Russia and China to resume their own tests, fuelling a new phase of nuclear modernisation and competitive validation of warhead designs.
  • Weakens Arms Control Frameworks:  It undermines the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the global verification regime under the International Monitoring System (IMS), which helped detect and deter testing activities.
  • Contradicts NPT’s Disarmament Obligation:  The decision runs counter to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), eroding trust between nuclear and non-nuclear states and weakening the treaty’s moral foundation.
    • Article VI of the NPT mandates all parties, particularly nuclear-weapon states, to negotiate in good faith for ending the nuclear arms race and achieving complete nuclear disarmament.
  • Accelerates Technological Arms Race:  It signals a shift from disarmament to technological brinkmanship, as nuclear states race to develop hypersonic, tactical, and miniaturised nuclear weapons.
• Regional Fallout (South Asia):
  • Potential Testing Cascade: The resumption of U.S. tests could trigger chain reactions in Asia—if China tests to validate its MIRV and hypersonic systems, India and Pakistan may feel compelled to respond.
  • Regional Parity and Escalation Risk: As of 2025, India has around 180 nuclear warheads and Pakistan about 170, indicating near parity but differing doctrines. Renewed testing could disturb the strategic equilibrium and heighten escalation risks.
  • Doctrinal Tensions: India’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and No-First-Use contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s first-use posture, making South Asia more prone to crisis instability if testing resumes.
  • Diplomatic Setback: Testing by any regional actor would undermine India’s long-standing advocacy of restraint and disarmament, damaging its credibility as a responsible nuclear power.
• Environmental and Diplomatic Implications:
  • Environmental Hazards: Both underground and atmospheric tests can cause radioactive contamination of air, soil, and groundwater, leading to long-term health hazards and ecological degradation.
  • Historical Evidence of Damage: Past testing sites such as Nevada (U.S.), Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), and Lop Nur (China) continue to show persistent radiation effects decades later.
  • Erosion of the U.S. Diplomatic Credibility: The move weakens Washington’s moral authority on non-proliferation and complicates negotiations for future arms-control frameworks such as New START or a future FMCT.
  • Impact on Global Non-Proliferation Leadership: By resuming tests, the U.S. risks losing its role as a norm-setter in nuclear restraint, reducing the overall momentum for global disarmament efforts.

Institutional Landscape of Nuclear Governance

• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1970): Prevents spread of nuclear weapons, promotes disarmament, and enables peaceful nuclear energy use.
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996): Bans all nuclear explosions but has not entered into force due to incomplete ratification.
• New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START, 2011): Caps deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems between the U.S. and Russia, expiring in February 2026.
• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2021): Prohibits the development, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons.
• Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT, Proposed): Aims to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; India supports negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards: Monitors peaceful nuclear materials and ensures compliance with non-proliferation norms.

India’s Position on Key Nuclear Treaties and Frameworks

About India’s Nuclear Journey

• Pokhran-I (1974): Conducted on 18 May 1974, codenamed “Smiling Buddha”, marking India’s entry into the nuclear club.
  • Officially described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”, but strategically aimed at ensuring technological sovereignty and deterrence credibility.
  • Resulted in international sanctions and India’s exclusion from global nuclear commerce.
• Pokhran-II (1998): Conducted on 11 and 13 May 1998 under “Operation Shakti”, consisting of five underground tests including fission and thermonuclear devices.
  • Declared India as a nuclear weapons state, formalising its strategic autonomy and minimum deterrence posture.
  • Triggered international sanctions, but later paved the way for the 2008 Indo–U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement.
• Strategic Legacy: Enhanced India’s technological credibility and defence self-reliance.
  • Shaped the evolution of India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) and No-First-Use (NFU) doctrines.
  • Highlighted the cost of nuclear sovereignty—from economic sanctions to enduring regional rivalry and global scrutiny.

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About India’s Nuclear Doctrine

• Core Principles: India’s nuclear doctrine, formally articulated in January 2003, is built upon credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and No-First-Use (NFU). It commits India to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere.
• Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) Under Evolution: CMD is a dynamic concept, focusing on maintaining capabilities sufficient to cause unacceptable damage to deter adversaries. Given the advancements like China’s MIRV-equipped DF-41 missiles and Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), India’s deterrent posture now focuses on survivable second-strike capability, canisterised missiles, and sea-based deterrence through the Arihant-class SSBN fleet.
• No-First-Use (NFU) Debate and Strategic Flexibility:
  • For Retention: NFU strengthens India’s moral and diplomatic credibility, reinforces its NSG aspirations, and underlines its commitment to strategic restraint.
  • For Review: Pakistan’s TNWs and China’s MIRV systems raise questions about NFU’s sufficiency. Some experts advocate conditional flexibility under extreme circumstances.
  • Current Position: India continues to uphold NFU, though policymakers have indicated the possibility of reviewing it if security dynamics evolve further.
• Technological and Strategic Modernisation: To maintain deterrence credibility, India is:
  • Developing Agni-V and Agni-VI missiles with MIRV and MaRV technologies.
  • Operationalising Arihant-class SSBNs and expanding SLBM capabilities (K-4 and K-5 series).
  • Strengthening Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) networks.
  • Enhancing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) systems.
• Ethical and Strategic Balance: India strives to maintain strategic readiness with ethical restraint, advocating global disarmament and non-proliferation while ensuring credible deterrence against dual threats from China and Pakistan.

India’s Strategic Concerns and Implications

• Dual-Front Nuclear Pressure: India faces simultaneous nuclear challenges from China’s MIRV-capable arsenal and Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs).
  • Both adversaries threaten India’s second-strike survivability and NFU credibility.
• Deterrence Credibility and Modernisation: India must sustain Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) through technological upgrades.
  • Focus areas include:
    • Agni-V and Agni-VI with MIRV and MaRV technologies.
    • Expansion of Arihant-class SSBNs and K-4, K-5 SLBM systems.
    • Strengthened C3I (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence) and BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence).
• Economic and Strategic Balancing: Modernisation involves the “guns vs. butter” dilemma, where defence spending must not compromise social and developmental objectives.
  • Fiscal discipline is crucial to maintain stability between security and welfare imperatives.
• Diplomatic and Moral Posture: India’s No-First-Use (NFU) policy reinforces its image as a responsible nuclear power and enhances its NSG credentials.
  • However, renewed global testing threatens to undermine India’s diplomatic restraint advantage.
• Strategic Autonomy and Regional Stability: India must safeguard strategic autonomy while avoiding entanglement in the U.S.–China strategic rivalry.
  • A proactive role in IAEA safety norms, South Asian confidence-building, and global NFU advocacy can preserve regional stability.

Socio-Economic and Environmental Governance

• The Guns vs. Butter Dilemma:
  • Resource Diversion from Development: Escalating nuclear modernisation and defence expenditure create a “guns vs. butter” trade-off, where investments in warhead upgrades, missile systems, and deterrence infrastructure may divert funds from education, healthcare, and climate adaptation.
  • Opportunity Cost for Emerging Economies: For developing countries like India, excessive defence spending risks undermining human capital growth and social welfare commitments, thereby impacting sustainable development goals (SDGs).
• Environmental and Human Safety Concerns:
  • Peacetime Nuclear Risks: The 2019 Nyonoksa explosion in Russia, during a missile test, highlighted that even non-war testing of nuclear propulsion systems carries significant radiation exposure risks and environmental hazards.
  • Potential Civilian Fallout: Accidents or leaks at nuclear test or research facilities can cause long-term contamination of air, soil, and groundwater, threatening public health and regional ecology.
  • Historical Lessons: Incidents like Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) demonstrate the devastating and persistent impact of nuclear accidents, reinforcing the need for civilian safety and emergency preparedness.
• Strengthening Global Oversight and Governance:
  • Expanding IAEA’s Role: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should broaden its mandate to include monitoring of nuclear propulsion safety, radiation control during testing, and transparent reporting of nuclear incidents by all states.
  • Environmental Accountability: Establishing a global nuclear safety and environmental accountability framework, under UN and IAEA supervision, would enhance trust, transparency, and rapid response capacity in case of nuclear-related accidents.
  • National-Level Preparedness:  India should reinforce the role of its Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) in enforcing strict safety audits, radiation management, and public disclosure norms to maintain both technological confidence and civilian safety.

Challenges Associated with Nuclear Testing

• Environmental and Health Risks: Tests can cause radioactive contamination of air, water, and soil, with long-term ecological consequences.
  • Past global test sites like Semipalatinsk and Nevada still show radiation-linked health issues.
• Verification and Compliance Gaps: Subcritical or computer-simulated tests exploit loopholes in the CTBT, making detection and verification difficult.
  • Inadequate international oversight mechanisms enable covert capability advancements.
• Diplomatic and Normative Erosion: Resumed testing undermines NPT and CTBT norms, weakening global disarmament momentum.
  • Testing states risk sanctions, isolation, and loss of moral standing in global forums.
• Economic and Strategic Trade-offs: Testing demands significant financial resources and may divert funds from developmental priorities like health, education, and infrastructure.
  • Regional testing can spark arms race spirals, especially in volatile zones such as South Asia.

Way Forward

• Global Level Actions: Initiate U.S.–Russia–China trilateral arms control dialogue before New START’s expiry.
  • Promote FMCT adoption and a verified global testing moratorium covering subcritical tests.
• National Level Actions (India): Retain NFU while upgrading MIRV, MaRV, and C3I infrastructure.
  • Strengthen BMD and SSA for early threat detection.
  • Enhance nuclear safety frameworks under AERB supervision.
• Diplomatic Level Initiatives: Lead advocacy for a collective global NFU commitment.
  • Strengthen hotline communication in South Asia and promote IAEA-backed safety conventions.
  • Reinforce India’s leadership in the Global South for responsible modernisation and disarmament advocacy.

Conclusion

India’s nuclear path from Pokhran to today embodies sovereign security with responsible restraint. Amid renewed global testing, India must sustain credible deterrence, ethical leadership, and technological readiness while preserving diplomatic balance in a volatile multipolar world.

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