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Introduction

India’s engagement with the Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan symbolised its strategic ambition to gain a foothold in Central Asia and enhance surveillance over Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its withdrawal, however, highlights the complex geopolitics of the region where external dependencies and power rivalries continue to shape India’s strategic options.

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Factors leading to India’s withdrawal from Ayni Airbase

• Russian control and limited operational autonomy: Although India financed and modernised the Ayni base, Russia retained control over operations.
  Eg: Moscow’s reluctance to allow Indian fighter deployments restricted India’s independent use of the base.
• China’s expanding influence in Central Asia: China’s growing economic and military ties with Tajikistan (SCO, BRI) made India’s continued presence diplomatically sensitive.
  Eg: China’s security patrols near the Wakhan Corridor reduced Tajik flexibility to host Indian forces.
• Tajikistan’s balancing act under Russian pressure: Tajikistan’s reliance on Russian security (via CSTO) restricts India’s independent operations there.
  Eg: Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division is still stationed in Tajikistan, curbing external base usage.
• High logistical and financial costs: Supplying and maintaining personnel and equipment in a landlocked region without direct access routes was costly and complex.
• Shift in India’s strategic priorities: India began prioritising maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean and infrastructure projects like Chabahar Port over distant land bases.

Impact on India’s strategic presence and influence in Central Asia

• Diminished military leverage in the region: Ayni, India’s sole overseas base near Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China, strengthened western defence reach, its loss limits India’s regional strategic depth.
• Reduced symbolic and diplomatic presence: India’s exit weakens its claim as a long-term strategic partner in Central Asia, ceding ground to Russia and China.
  Eg: China now operates training and border facilities in Tajikistan, increasing its dominance.
• Dependence on soft-power and multilateral engagement: Without physical presence, India’s influence now relies on forums like the SCO, INSTC, and development aid.
  Eg: India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy must now rely on trade, technology, and education rather than defence presence.
• Weakened intelligence and counterterror capabilities: Loss of Ayni reduces India’s ability to monitor extremist movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northern frontier.
• Strategic setback to regional connectivity goals: Without an operational foothold, India’s integration into Central Asia’s transport and energy corridors faces greater logistical and diplomatic challenges.

Conclusion

India’s exit from Ayni marks a shift from hard-power projection to soft-power diplomacy in Central Asia. While it constrains India’s military leverage, it underscores the need for deeper economic, technological, and multilateral engagement to sustain influence amid intensifying Sino-Russian dominance in the region.

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