Q. Judicial independence and accountability are the twin pillars of a robust constitutional framework. Explain the procedure for the removal of High Court and Supreme Court judges in India. Examine the limitations and potential gaps in the current framework. (15 Marks, 250 Words)

Core Demand of the Question

  • Procedure for Removal of High Court and Supreme Court Judges
  • Limitations and Potential Gaps in the Current Framework
  • Filling the Gaps: The Path to Reform

Answer

Introduction

Judicial independence and accountability are the twin pillars of a robust constitutional framework, ensuring that the judiciary remains free from executive interference while remaining answerable to the law. In India, the removal of judges is a rigorous process designed to protect them from political whims, though it has recently been criticized for its “laborious and political” nature.

Body

Procedure for Removal of High Court and Supreme Court Judges

The procedure for both is identical, governed by Articles 124(4) and 217(1) of the Constitution, further detailed by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

  • Initiation of Motion: A removal motion must be signed by 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha and submitted to the Speaker/Chairman.
    Eg: In 2018, an impeachment motion against CJI Dipak Misra was initiated by 71 MPs but was rejected at the threshold by the Rajya Sabha Chairman.
  • Investigation Committee: If admitted, the presiding officer constitutes a three-member committee: a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist.
    Eg: The committee in the Justice Soumitra Sen (2011) case found him guilty of misappropriating funds prior to his elevation.
  • Parliamentary Vote: If the committee finds the judge guilty, both Houses must pass the address in the same session by a Special Majority (Majority of total membership and of members present and voting).
    Eg: The motion against Justice V. Ramaswami (1993) failed in the Lok Sabha as the ruling party abstained, leading to a lack of the required majority.
  • Presidential Order: Upon receiving the address from both Houses, the President of India issues the final order of removal.

Limitations and Potential Gaps in the Current Framework

  • Discretionary Veto Power: The Speaker/Chairman has absolute discretion to admit or reject a motion at the threshold without providing detailed legal justification.
    Eg: Legal experts argue this “gatekeeping” can be used politically to block legitimate inquiries into judicial misconduct.
  • High Political Threshold: The requirement of a Special Majority makes the process highly susceptible to “party-line voting,” often shielding judges from accountability.
  • Narrow Grounds: Removal is restricted only to “proved misbehaviour” or “incapacity,” leaving no mechanism to address “minor misconduct” or judicial impropriety.
    Eg: The Justice S.K. Gangele (2015) inquiry found material insufficient for “removal,” yet highlighted the gap between bad behavior and “impeachable” offenses.
  • Absence of Interim Measures: There is no statutory provision to restrain a judge from judicial work during the pendency of the inquiry, unless done voluntarily or through “in-house” peer pressure.

Filling the Gaps: The Path to Reform

  • Judicial Standards Legislation: Reintroduce a revamped Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill to define “misbehaviour” and set clear ethical norms.
    Eg: The 2022 Bill proposed a mechanism for citizens to lodge complaints, which is currently missing in the constitutional process.
  • Automatic Committee Trigger: Amend the 1968 Act to ensure that any motion fulfilling the numerical requirement is automatically referred to an inquiry committee.
  • Graded Accountability Scale: Introduce “minor penalties” (like public censure or withdrawal of work) for conduct that does not warrant removal but undermines judicial dignity.
    Eg: The SC’s “In-House Procedure” (1999) already allows the CJI to withdraw work, but this needs statutory backing to ensure uniformity.
  • Independent Oversight Body: Establish a permanent, independent body comprising retired judges and civil society members to screen complaints before they reach Parliament.

Conclusion

The independence of the judiciary is a part of the “Basic Structure” of the Constitution, but it cannot become a shield for individual opacity. As the Supreme Court observed, “A single dishonest judge disgraces the entire system.” By moving from a purely political “impeachment” model to a rule-based accountability framework, India can ensure that its judges remain both fiercely independent and impeccably accountable, preserving public trust in the temple of justice.

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UDAAN PRELIMS WALLAH
Comprehensive coverage with a concise format
Integration of PYQ within the booklet
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हिंदी में भी उपलब्ध
Quick Revise Now !
UDAAN PRELIMS WALLAH
Comprehensive coverage with a concise format
Integration of PYQ within the booklet
Designed as per recent trends of Prelims questions
हिंदी में भी उपलब्ध

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