Recently, the Indian Prime Minister said India is close to being free from Maoist terror, with only three LWE-affected districts remaining. 

• Over 303 Maoists, including 210 in Chhattisgarh, recently surrendered, and conflict zones will celebrate Diwali after 60–70 years.

Current Status of LWE-Affected Areas & Development

• National Target: Complete elimination of Left Wing Extremism by March 31, 2026.
• Achievement: Official figures show that more than 1,600 Maoist cadres have laid down arms in 2025, signaling a sharp drop in insurgent strength and morale. 
• Most-Affected Districts: Reduced from 6 to 3 (Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur), all located in Chhattisgarh.
• Total LWE-Affected Districts: Reduced from 18 to 11 as of 2025.
• Violence incidents dropped by 81% (2010–2024).
• Comparison: In 2013, India had 126 districts affected by Naxal violence across multiple states.
• Recognition of Police Forces: The Chhattisgarh Police received the President’s Colour Award for exceptional courage and service — one of India’s highest honours for state police forces.

About Maoism

• Definition: Maoism is a variant of communism based on Mao Zedong’s ideology, advocating the capture of state power through armed insurgency, mass mobilization, and strategic rural bases.
• Indian Context: Originated in Naxalbari, West Bengal (1967) as a peasant revolt led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal against feudal exploitation.
• Formation of CPI (Maoist): In 2004, the People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), giving rise to the modern LWE movement.

Evolution of Maoism in India

• Initial Stage (1967–1980s): Limited to West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar; state suppression forced Maoists underground.
• Expansion (1980s–2000s): Spread through the Red Corridor, exploiting tribal discontent and weak governance.
• Peak (2000s): Marked by deadly attacks like the 2010 Dantewada massacre (76 CRPF personnel killed).
• Decline (Post-2010): Comprehensive government strategy integrating security operations and development programs led to significant weakening of Maoist influence.

Core Features of Maoist Ideology

• Armed Struggle: Maoist ideology follows Mao Zedong’s strategy of “Protracted People’s War”, which emphasizes building a rural base and conducting guerrilla warfare.
• Focus on Marginalized Communities: The Maoists claim to fight for the rights of marginalized communities, particularly tribals and landless farmers, but they also use coercion to recruit and sustain their movement.
• Opposition to Democracy: Maoists reject democratic institutions, viewing them as tools of bourgeois oppression. 
  • They aim to replace the existing system with a communist state based on Maoist principles.

Factors Contributing to Maoism/Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)

• Land Alienation and Displacement: The lack of land reforms and displacement of tribals due to development projects are major triggers for Maoist activity.
  • Large-scale displacement caused by mining projects in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh has fueled resentment among tribals.
  • According to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, over 40% of those displaced by development projects between 1951 and 1990 were tribals, but only 25% received rehabilitation.
• Poverty and Lack of Development: LWE-affected areas often have higher levels of poverty and lower access to basic facilities like education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
  • In the tribal belts of Bastar (Chhattisgarh), development indices such as literacy and healthcare lag far behind the national average.
  • Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas: Report of an Expert Group to Planning Commission highlights that poverty, deprivation, and lack of access to basic resources are prevalent in these regions, contributing to the support for Naxalite movements.
• Governance Deficit: Weak state presence and inadequate delivery of public services in remote tribal areas create a governance vacuum that Maoists exploit.
  • The absence of schools and healthcare facilities in remote villages of Odisha has made it easier for Maoists to win local support.
  • In some LWE-affected areas, Panchayati Raj positions remain vacant due to lack of security and infrastructure.
  • D. Bandopadhyay Committee, 2006 concluded that Naxalism spread due to governance failures and widespread discrimination against tribal communities in economic, social, political, and cultural life.
• Exploitation by Landlords and Corporations: Tribals and marginalized communities face exploitation by landlords, moneylenders, and corporations, deepening socio-economic inequalities.
  • In Andhra Pradesh, tribals were coerced into giving up their lands to mining corporations, triggering Maoist uprisings in the 1990s.
• Social and Political Marginalization: Tribals and Dalits, who are the primary supporters of LWE, often feel excluded from the political process and are unable to access justice.
  • The failure to implement the Forest Rights Act, 2006, has left many tribals without ownership of their ancestral lands.
  • Only 19.8% of claims under the Forest Rights Act were approved by 2022, according to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
• Lack of Connectivity and Infrastructure: Remote areas with poor road and telecom connectivity become isolated from government reach, making them fertile grounds for Maoist activities.

Difference Between Maoism, Naxalism, and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)

Government’s Efforts to Counter LWE/Maoism in India

• National Policy and Action Plan (2015): The government adopted a multi-pronged strategy combining security, development, and ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities.
  • Components: Focus on capacity building, strengthening governance, and perception management.
• SAMADHAN Strategy: Introduced by the Ministry of Home Affairs, SAMADHAN is a comprehensive policy to address LWE. It stands for:
  • S for Smart Leadership, A for Aggressive Strategy, M for Motivation and Training, A for Actionable Intelligence, D for Dashboard-based Key Result Areas and Key Performance Indicators, H for Harnessing Technology, A for Action Plan for Each Theatre and N for No access to Financing.
  • Use of drones and UAVs for actionable intelligence has improved the effectiveness of anti-Maoist operations.
• Rehabilitation and Surrender Policies: Comprehensive rehabilitation policies for surrendered Maoists include skill development, education, and financial packages.
  • Chhattisgarh’s policy facilitated the surrender of 837 Maoists in 2023.
  • Rehabilitation schemes under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme cover ex-gratia payments and support for reintegration.
• Empowering Local Governance: Focus on strengthening local governance through effective implementation of the Forest Rights Act (2006) and other welfare schemes.
  • Increased engagement with Panchayati Raj institutions to build trust and ensure delivery of public services in affected regions.
• Civic Action Programmes (CAP): Conducts welfare activities like medical camps, sports events, and educational drives to bridge the gap between security forces and the local population.
  • CAP funds worth ₹123 crores have been utilized for welfare activities in LWE regions since 2017.
• Awareness and Media Plans: Implemented as a sub-scheme of the Umbrella Scheme ‘Modernization of Police Forces’.
  • Countering Maoist propaganda through radio jingles, documentaries, pamphlets, and youth exchange programs.
  • Radio programs in tribal dialects have been effective in countering Maoist narratives in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
• Monitoring and Coordination: Regular review meetings involving the Union Home Minister, Chief Ministers of affected states, and top security officials.
  • Frequent visits by Union and State officials to LWE-affected regions have improved coordination and morale of forces.

Impact of Government Measures

• Overall Impact and Measurable Decline:
  • Shrinking Geographical Spread: The footprint of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) has contracted from 126 districts in 2013 to 38 in 2024, and further to 11 in 2025, with only Bijapur, Sukma, and Narayanpur (Chhattisgarh) now listed as “most affected.”
  • Reduced Violence and Casualties: LWE-related incidents have declined by over 80%, from 1,936 in 2010 to 374 in 2024. Fatalities among civilians and security personnel have fallen from 1,005 in 2010 to around 140 in 2025, marking the lowest level in four decades.
  • Operational and Ideological Weakening: Over 1,040 Maoists surrendered in 2025, including senior leaders, revealing internal divisions, reduced recruitment, and waning ideological motivation within the movement.
  • Reclaiming Lost Territories: Former Maoist strongholds such as Budha Pahar (Jharkhand) and parts of Bastar and Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) have been reclaimed, with schools, health centres, and police camps re-established to restore state governance.
• Impact of Security and Enforcement Measures:
  • Strengthened Security Infrastructure: Establishment of fortified police stations, forward camps, and deployment of elite forces like CoBRA, Greyhounds, and DRG have denied Maoists safe havens and enhanced operational capability.
  • Precision Operations and Technology Use: Targeted missions such as Operation Black Forest (2025) neutralized top Maoist leaders using drones, UAVs, and advanced surveillance, improving real-time intelligence and coordination.
  • Financial Disruption: Crackdowns by investigative agencies have dismantled funding networks, seizing assets from extortion, illegal mining, and front NGOs, effectively choking Maoist financing.
  • Enhanced Coordination: The SAMADHAN doctrine promotes joint command, shared intelligence, and frequent reviews, ensuring synchronised operations between central and state forces.
• Impact of Development and Governance Initiatives:
  • Connectivity and Infrastructure Expansion: Over 14,600 km of roads and 7,768 telecom towers have connected remote tribal areas, improving mobility, communication, and economic access.
  • Empowerment and Livelihoods: Schemes like the Aspirational Districts Programme, Van Dhan Yojana, and PMGSY have boosted livelihoods, while Eklavya Model Schools and ITIs empower tribal youth through education and skills.
  • Financial Inclusion: Expansion of banks, ATMs, and post offices has enabled Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT) and reduced dependence on informal credit networks.
  • Building Public Trust: The Civic Action Programme (CAP) through health camps, sports meets, and the Bastar Olympics has strengthened people-security relations and community confidence.
• Impact of Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies:
  • Record Surrenders: A total of 1,040 Maoists surrendered in 2025, reflecting growing disillusionment and the success of rehabilitation efforts.
  • Reintegration through Support: Surrendered cadres receive financial aid, vocational training, education, and psychosocial support via the e-Samadhan Platform, aiding social reintegration.
  • Declining Cohesion: Leadership losses, ideological drift, and internal distrust have weakened organizational unity and disrupted operational command within Maoist ranks.

Check Out UPSC CSE Books

Visit PW Store

Challenges in Controlling Maoism/LWE

• Difficult Geography and Terrain: Maoist strongholds are in densely forested, hilly, and remote areas like Dandakaranya and Saranda. These regions offer natural cover, limiting troop movement and hampering logistical support.
• Socio-Economic Deprivation: Persistent poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, and lack of education make local communities vulnerable to Maoist recruitment. Many youth see insurgency as an outlet for expressing socio-economic frustrations.
• Governance Deficit: Instances of local corruption and administrative apathy can hamper the delivery of welfare schemes, eroding public trust in the state.
• Inadequate Intelligence and Coordination: Gaps in intelligence sharing between central and state agencies have led to major lapses — for instance, the 2013 Darbha Valley ambush was attributed to poor coordination.
• Alienation of Tribals and Cultural Disconnect: Many tribals view government forces as outsiders. The failure to respect tribal customs and the slow implementation of the Forest Rights Act have fueled alienation.
• Difficulty in Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Surrendered Maoists often face social stigma, psychological trauma, and limited livelihood opportunities. Lack of post-surrender monitoring weakens rehabilitation schemes.
• External Support and Networking: The CPI (Maoist) maintains linkages with North-East insurgent groups like the PLA (Manipur) and international Maoist organizations in Nepal and the Philippines, aiding in arms procurement and training.
• Balancing Development and Security: Excessive militarization risks alienating civilians, while prioritizing development without adequate security exposes projects to sabotage. Achieving equilibrium remains a policy challenge.

Way Forward

• Strengthen Local Governance: Ensure Panchayati Raj empowerment, fill vacant posts, and decentralize development decisions.
• Inclusive Development: Prioritize tribal rights, skill-building, and livelihood generation through cooperative models.
• Anti-Corruption Measures: Establish transparent monitoring mechanisms and social audits to prevent leakage of development funds and hold corrupt officials accountable.
• Effective Implementation of FRA (2006): Grant land and forest rights to restore confidence in state institutions.
• Enhanced Intelligence Framework: Establish joint command centers for real-time information sharing between agencies.
• Rehabilitation with Dignity: Provide education, psychological support, and sustained income options to surrendered cadres.
• Community Engagement: Foster trust through cultural respect, local recruitment in police forces, and youth outreach.
• Counter-Ideology Measures: Use education, awareness, and media narratives to delegitimize Maoist propaganda.
• Leveraging Technology: Deploy AI-enabled surveillance, satellite imagery, and drones to monitor difficult terrains effectively.

Conclusion

India’s fight against Maoism is moving from security to development, dialogue, and democratic empowerment. With inclusive governance and local participation, a Maoist-free India is within reach, promising peace and unlocking the socio-economic potential of tribal regions.

DOWNLOAD PDF