NATO and the Greenland Crisis

Recent attempts by the United States to exert strategic, economic, and diplomatic pressure on NATO allies over Greenland signal deep stress within alliance-based security and the post-World War II multilateral order.

Key Development

• U.S. Acquisition of Greenland: The issue centres on President Donald Trump’s renewed interest in acquiring Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, a NATO member.
• Tariffs as Pressure: Recently, the US imposed 10% U.S. tariffs on 8 NATO allies from Feb 1, 2026, over Greenland opposition.
• Deal or Duties: Tariffs to jump to 25% by June unless the U.S. acquires Greenland.
• Security Cover: U.S. cites Russian–Chinese encroachment and proposes an Arctic missile shield (“Golden Dome”).

Why Does the US Want Greenland?

• Strategic Arctic Location: Greenland’s position between North America and Europe makes it crucial for controlling the Arctic and North Atlantic region, especially for monitoring movement across the Atlantic and emerging Arctic sea routes.
• Natural Resources and Critical Minerals: Greenland has potential reserves of rare earth elements, uranium, iron, oil, and gas. 
  • The United States currently lacks a reliable domestic supply chain for REEs. China dominates the sector, accounting for around 60% of global REE mining and over 90% of processing. 
• Military and Early-Warning Importance: The US operates the Pituffik Space Base (earlier Thule Air Base), which is vital for missile early-warning systems, space surveillance, and homeland security, forming a key part of US and NATO defence architecture.
• Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change: Melting ice due to climate change is opening new shipping routes and strategic spaces, increasing Greenland’s importance in Arctic geopolitics.
• Great Power Rivalry (US–Russia–China): The US views Russia’s Arctic militarisation and China’s growing commercial and strategic presence as threats to NATO’s northern flank, making Greenland central to power competition.
• Long-standing US Defence Presence: Under the 1951 US–Denmark Defence Agreement, the US enjoys extensive defence rights in Greenland and has earlier operated up to 17 military bases, showing deep historical involvement.
• Continuity of US Strategic Interest: Past US administrations also attempted to acquire Greenland, indicating that current moves reflect a long-term strategic outlook, not a sudden policy shift.

Impact of the US Move on NATO

• Intra-Alliance Coercion: The use of tariffs, political pressure, and strategic threats against NATO allies challenges the alliance’s core principle of mutual trust and voluntary cooperation, creating internal friction.
• Collective Defence Paradox (Article 5): NATO’s Article 5 was designed to address attacks by external adversaries, not internal disputes.
  • Denmark has indicated it could invoke Article 5 if Greenland were threatened, creating legal and political uncertainty within the alliance.
  • Prior to any Article 5 invocation, Denmark could invoke Article 4, which mandates consultations when a member’s territorial integrity or security is threatened.
• Breach of Political and Moral Expectations: Denmark has been a reliable NATO ally, contributing troops and sacrifices (e.g., 43 soldiers lost in Afghanistan post-9/11).
  • Any US move against Greenland would contradict moral and political expectations of alliance solidarity.
• Threat to NATO Credibility and Deterrence: Actions that undermine alliance norms could weaken NATO’s deterrence posture, making it appear less credible to external adversaries.

About North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

• Historical Background: NATO was established on 4 April 1949 in the aftermath of World War II to counter the Soviet security threat and prevent further instability in Europe. 
• Purpose: It aimed to institutionalise collective defence and transatlantic political-military cooperation between North America and Europe.
• Membership: The alliance began with 12 founding members and has gradually expanded to 32 members (as of March 2024), reflecting its continued strategic relevance.
  • Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, Türkiye, United Kingdom, & United States. 
• Headquarters: NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, Belgium
• Core Role and Objectives of NATO:
  • Collective Defence (Article 5): The cornerstone of NATO is Article 5, which states that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all, forming the alliance’s primary deterrent.
  • Security Consultations (Article 4): Article 4 enables members to consult on matters of common security concern, extending NATO’s role beyond territorial defence.
  • Expanded Security Mandate: NATO’s mission has evolved to include counter-terrorism, cyber security, piracy, peacekeeping, and crisis management beyond Europe.
• Operational Role and Missions:
  • Out-of-Area Operations: NATO led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has conducted missions in Kosovo, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean.
  • Training and Capacity Building: The alliance conducts joint military exercises, strengthens interoperability, and supports partner organisations such as the UN, EU, and African Union.
• North Atlantic Council (NAC): The NAC is NATO’s principal political decision-making body, where all members are represented and decisions are taken by consensus, reinforcing NATO’s role as a political forum for conflict management.
• Funding Mechanism: 
  • Shared Financial Responsibility: Members contribute based on Gross National Income (GNI) to fund NATO’s headquarters, command structures, missions, and joint equipment.
  • Military Contributions: Each country also contributes troops, capabilities, and defence spending, rather than relying solely on financial payments.
  • Joint Innovation Initiatives: NATO supports multinational funds for research and emerging defence technologies.

Crisis of Multilateralism and the Rules-Based Global Order

• Erosion of the Alliance-Based and Multilateral Order: The Greenland crisis signals a weakening of the post-war alliance and multilateral system. 
  • It reflects a shift from rules-based, institution-led cooperation to unilateral and power-driven arrangements.
• Strategic Advantage to Rival Powers: Russia benefits from visible NATO divisions, aligning with its objective of weakening Western unity.
  • China exploits internal fractures to expand its strategic and economic influence, especially in contested regions like the Arctic.
• Acceleration of Arctic Militarisation: Increased tensions hasten military build-up in the Arctic, raising risks of miscalculation, accidents, and escalation in a previously low-conflict zone.
• Rising Nuclear Proliferation Risks: A weakened NATO could trigger security anxieties among allies, pushing countries like Germany, Poland, Canada, Japan, and South Korea to reconsider nuclear deterrence, fuelling a new arms race.

India’s Strategic Dilemma in a Fragmenting Global Order

• Balancing Engagement and Multilateral Legitimacy:
  • Strategic Concerns: India faces the challenge of engaging with major powers while preserving the credibility of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, where it seeks long-term reform and leadership.
  • Reassessment of Multilateral Strategy: Growing bypassing of global institutions by powerful states forces India to adapt its diplomacy to a more power-driven international system.
• Regional and Bilateral Considerations:
  • The Pakistan Factor: Shifting geopolitical alignments in West Asia and the Arctic could alter regional influence balances, affecting India’s strategic interests.
  • Tariff Exposure: India faces up to 50% US tariffs in certain sectors, making trade relations an important factor in its foreign policy calculus.
  • The “Veto” Rivalry: Weakening of multilateral institutions indirectly affects India’s long-standing campaign for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
• Global Security Spillovers:
  • NATO Weakening: Instability within NATO and Western alliances indirectly affects India’s strategic environment, given interconnected global security threats.
  • Arctic and Resource Implications: Rising Arctic competition influences future trade routes, energy security, and critical mineral geopolitics, areas of growing Indian interest.
• Normative and Strategic Positioning:
  • Strategic Autonomy: India’s emphasis on sovereignty, multilateralism, and rule-based order contrasts with coercive alliance politics, reinforcing its preference for flexible, issue-based partnerships.
  • Strategic Opportunity: Western instability highlights India’s diplomatic flexibility and the relevance of non-alliance-based, targeted partnerships in global affairs.

Check Out UPSC CSE Books

Visit PW Store

Way Forward

• For NATO and the Western Alliance:
  • Re-centre Alliance on Shared Principles: NATO must clearly reaffirm its commitment to sovereignty, non-coercion, and consensus-based decision-making, which form the moral and political foundation of the alliance.
  • De-escalate Through Institutional Diplomacy: Internal disagreements should be addressed through formal political consultations and mediation mechanisms, avoiding unilateral pressure or strategic intimidation.
  • Depoliticise Trade and Security Instruments: Economic tools such as tariffs and sanctions should not be weaponised against allies, as this erodes trust and weakens alliance cohesion.
  • Clarify Legal and Strategic Red Lines: NATO should evolve clear norms on intra-alliance conduct, including how Article 5 applies in internal crises, to prevent ambiguity and escalation.
  • Develop a Cooperative Arctic Security Framework: A shared Arctic doctrine focusing on transparency, confidence-building, and restraint is essential to prevent militarisation and miscalculation.
• For the International Community:
  • Reinforce the Primacy of International Law: States must uphold territorial sovereignty and peaceful dispute resolution, especially in regions of emerging strategic competition.
  • Strengthen Multilateral Conflict-Management Mechanisms: Global and regional institutions should be empowered to manage great-power rivalry, reducing the risk of alliance breakdowns.
• For India:
  • Sustain Strategic Autonomy with Issue-Based Partnerships: India should continue balancing relations through flexible, non-alliance-based cooperation, preserving diplomatic space and strategic independence.
  • Expand Constructive Engagement in the Arctic: Active participation in Arctic governance forums will help India protect long-term interests in trade routes, energy, and critical minerals.
  • Champion Reform of Global Governance: India can use its diplomatic voice to support inclusive, rules-based institutional reforms that reduce coercion and enhance collective security.

Conclusion

The Greenland crisis and the proposed Board of Peace highlight a shift toward power-driven global politics, testing NATO’s cohesion and the post-1945 rules-based order. Long-term credibility now depends on unity, trust, and respect for sovereignty, underscoring Hedley Bull’s insight that power must be balanced by shared rules and institutions.

DOWNLOAD PDF