Answer

Introduction

Left Wing Extremism in central India, especially Bastar and Dandakaranya, stems from land alienation, resource exploitation, and tribal exclusion. Though security operations have weakened Maoists, lasting peace demands structural reforms through participatory governance that balances security with social justice and inclusive development.

Body

How Balancing Coercive State Capacity and Participatory Governance Can Address Structural Roots of LWE

• Integrated Security and Development Approach: A calibrated use of force can dismantle militant networks while parallel development initiatives address grievances related to land, livelihood, and governance.
  Eg: Government’s multi-pronged policy in Bastar focusing on security, rights, and welfare simultaneously.
• Tribal Empowerment and Resource Rights: Strengthening participatory governance through recognition of forest and land rights restores local trust in the State and reduces insurgent appeal.
  Eg: Tribals now increasingly view the government as the source of long-term welfare, not Maoists.
• Democratic Space for Dissent: Allowing peaceful resistance movements provides a non-violent channel for expressing grievances, reducing the need for armed struggle.
  Eg: The Chhattisgarh government’s decision to lift the ban on democratic movements like Moolvasi Bachao Andolan.
• Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Surrender and rehabilitation programs, when coupled with social acceptance and livelihood support, prevent recidivism among former insurgents.
  Eg: The policy of voluntary rehabilitation instead of compulsory recruitment into the District Reserve Guard (DRG).
• Community-Centric Governance: Deepening local participation through Panchayati Raj and tribal self-rule ensures accountability and inclusive development in LWE-affected areas.
  Eg: Expanding state presence in erstwhile Maoist strongholds through local administrative and welfare outreach.

Challenges in Achieving This Balance

• Overreliance on Military Approach: Excessive focus on “body counts” risks alienating local populations and undermines long-term peace.
  Eg: The discourse on LWE often prioritises insurgent casualties over civilian welfare.
• Weak Institutional Capacity: Limited administrative reach and corruption at the grassroots level hinder trust-building and service delivery.
  Eg: Governance gaps in interior Bastar persist despite improved security conditions.
• Weaponisation of Surrendered Cadres: Using former insurgents in counter-insurgency roles perpetuates cycles of violence and social division.
  Eg: Induction of surrendered Maoists into DRG has created societal tensions in conflict zones.
• Socioeconomic Inequities: Persistent deprivation, displacement, and weak implementation of welfare schemes continue to fuel discontent.
  Eg: Tribals’ struggles over resource access and livelihood security remain unresolved in several areas.
• Fragile Trust and Political Polarisation: Historical neglect and fear of state repression make community engagement difficult despite recent progress.
  Eg: Civilian casualties and human rights concerns in security operations strain State-community relations.

Conclusion

Ending Left Wing Extremism needs a shift from security-centric to people-centric governance empowering tribes, restoring land rights, and deepening democracy. A State balancing firmness with fairness can turn conflict zones into regions of inclusive peace and sustainable development.

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