Answer

Introduction

Naxalism, which began in the late 1960s as a revolutionary movement, grew into a major insurgency across 200+ districts but has sharply declined in recent years. In 2023, CPI (Maoist) admitted 357 cadre deaths, and the Union Home Minister expects its end by 2026, owing to a multi-pronged strategy of security, governance, and political measures.

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Challenges of Naxalism in India

• Threat to Internal Security: Naxalism undermines national integrity by waging guerrilla warfare against the state and destabilising governance in multiple states.
• Targeting Vulnerable Populations: The movement exploited socio-economic inequalities, mobilising marginalised tribals and poor communities against state neglect.
  Eg: Movement mobilised tribals and the urban poor, what Frantz Fanon called the “wretched of the earth.”
• Degeneration into Violence: Initially inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, it soon devolved into indiscriminate violence and internecine factionalism.
• Territorial Control in Heartland: The insurgents established “liberated zones” in forested interiors, creating a governance vacuum in central India.
  Eg: Epicentre in Dandakaranya (Bastar, Gadchiroli, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh) posed a governance vacuum.
• Urban Linkages: Expansion into intellectual and student circles blurred the line between dissent and militancy, sparking political controversies.
  Eg: The newer “Urban Naxal” discourse complicated distinction between dissenters and militants.

Multi-Pronged Strategy Behind the Decline

• Security-Centric Measures: Targeted security operations reduced militant capacity through coordinated action.
  Eg: “Operation Samadhan-Prahar” (2017 onwards) integrated intelligence, technology, and specialized forces like CoBRA.
• Inclusive Infrastructure development: Infrastructure expansion enabled deeper security penetration into Maoist strongholds.
  Eg: Over 10,000 km of roads and 2,300 telecom towers built in LWE areas under Road Requirement Plan-II.
• Integration of Technology: Use of technology enhanced surveillance, reducing the tactical advantage Maoists had in forests and inaccessible terrain.
  Eg: Deployment of UAVs and satellite imagery helped track Naxal movement in Chhattisgarh.
• Targeted Policy Implementation: Welfare schemes addressed root causes of discontent by providing jobs, food security, and connectivity to marginalized groups.
  Eg: Flagship schemes like MGNREGA and PMGSY prioritized in Naxal-affected districts.
• Education and Capacity Building: Education and skill-building initiatives diverted tribal youth from recruitment by insurgents by creating alternate livelihoods.
  Eg: “Eklavya Model Schools” and skill centers established in Jharkhand and Odisha.
• Sustained Political Consensus: Surrender and rehabilitation policies weakened Maoist ranks by incentivizing cadres to rejoin mainstream society.
  Eg: Surrender cum Rehabilitation policy offering financial aid, vocational training, housing, and jobs.

Limitations of the multi-pronged Strategy

• Over-securitisation of the conflict: Heavy reliance on encounters and force-centric measures risks alienating tribal populations and creating new resentment.
  Eg: In Bastar, reports of alleged fake encounters have fueled mistrust between locals and security forces.
• Misclassification of dissent as extremism: Labelling activists, academics, or civil society groups as “urban Naxals” dilutes legitimate voices and undermines democracy.
  Eg: Several human rights activists have faced UAPA charges despite weak evidence, raising concerns of overreach.
• Persistence of socio-economic deprivation: Despite development efforts, poverty, land alienation, and lack of healthcare/education remain triggers for discontent.
  Eg: Tribal districts in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand continue to rank among the lowest in Human Development Indicators.
• Geographical displacement of violence: Crackdowns in one state often shift insurgent activity into neighbouring vulnerable areas, creating a cycle of violence.
• Cognitive bias in threat perception: Focusing narrowly on Maoists can blindside policymakers to new forms of discontent and insurgency.
  Eg: Security forces’ overemphasis on Maoism risks neglecting emerging extremist outfits in North-East and urban centres.

Conclusion

The decline of Naxalism reflects the success of India’s calibrated, multi-pronged approach combining security force dominance, leadership targeting, and governance penetration, while avoiding excessive militarisation. As suggested by Second ARC, Significance of democratic decentralisation for better governance in extremism-prone areas is crucial. 

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