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Introduction

Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, which killed over 200,000 people directly and from radiation sickness, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict. Despite this norm of non-use, rising geopolitical tensions, nuclear modernisation, and weak international governance now threaten global security. Preventing future fallout requires urgent reforms in disarmament, deterrence, and diplomacy.

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Contemporary Challenges Posed by Nuclear Arsenals

• Nuclear Modernisation and Tactical Warheads: Ongoing innovation in nuclear delivery systems makes weapons more “useable” and precision-targeted.
   Eg: Russia and the US are upgrading arsenals with hypersonic, low-yield tactical nukes, blurring war-fighting thresholds.
• Breakdown of Global Norms and Threat Inflation: Deterrence stability is eroding as nuclear threats become diplomatic tools in regional conflicts.
   Eg: Russia’s Ukraine war threats; India’s warning against Pakistan’s “nuclear blackmail” during 2019 Balakot strikes.
• Lack of Legal Prohibition on Use: No international treaty explicitly bans the use of nuclear weapons, even for first strike.
  Eg: NPT (1968) limits proliferation but not use; CTBT (1996) bans tests, not weapons; the 2017 Ban Treaty lacks nuclear possessor signatories.
• Increased Risk of Miscalculation and Accidents: Nuclear incidents may arise from misperception, system failure, or human error.
  Eg: Castle Bravo test (1954) exposed Japanese fishermen 86 miles away; the risk of unintended fallout remains real.
• Weaponisation of Political Signalling: Nuclear rhetoric is increasingly used for coercive diplomacy and power projection.
  Eg: North Korea’s missile tests often coincide with US–South Korea drills to extract geopolitical concessions.

Effectiveness of Existing Nuclear Governance Mechanisms

• Containment of Horizontal Proliferation: Treaties like NPT have limited the spread of nuclear weapons to new states.
• Institutional Role of IAEA in Peaceful Use and Monitoring: The International Atomic Energy Agency facilitates civilian nuclear energy while ensuring compliance through inspections.
  Eg: IAEA safeguards helped verify the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) until US withdrawal in 2018.
• Promotion of Norms Against Testing through CTBT: Even without formal enforcement, CTBT has fostered a strong global norm against nuclear testing.
  Eg: Over 180 countries have signed the CTBT.
• Export Control Regimes Enhance Material Accountability: Multilateral groups like NSG, MTCR, and Wassenaar Arrangement help regulate sensitive tech transfers.
  Eg: India’s inclusion in MTCR has improved its access to missile technologies while ensuring transparency.
• UNSC Resolutions as Deterrents to Rogue Proliferation: Binding Security Council resolutions act as legal and political checks on illicit programmes.
  Eg: UNSC Res. 1718 imposed sanctions on North Korea following its nuclear tests.
• Moral Deterrence by Hibakusha Survivors: The testimonies of atomic bomb survivors keep humanitarian memory alive.
    Eg: Nihon Hidankyo won the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for spreading anti-nuclear awareness globally.

Limitations of Existing Nuclear Governance Mechanisms

• Discriminatory Nature of NPT Regime: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entrenches nuclear weapon states’ privileges, creating a two-tier global order.
  Eg: India is not a signatory to NPT as it legitimizes only five nuclear powers (P5) and excludes others like India and Israel.
• Lack of Universality and Enforcement Mechanisms: Key nations including India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are outside major treaties, weakening their global enforceability.
• Failure to Address New Threats: Current treaties don’t cover emerging technologies like low-yield warheads, AI-based launch systems, or hypersonic glide vehicles.
• Outdated Verification and Monitoring Tools: Mechanisms like IAEA safeguards focus on declared materials, missing clandestine or dual-use tech developments.
  Eg: Iran’s covert nuclear programme continued for years despite inspections under IAEA.
• Ineffectiveness of CTBT and FMCT: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) hasn’t entered into force; the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations remain stalled.
  Eg: China and the US have not ratified CTBT, and FMCT remains blocked at the Conference on Disarmament.
• Narrow Representation in Global Decision-making: Export control regimes like NSG and MTCR are dominated by Western powers, marginalising Global South voices.
  Eg: India, despite its clean non-proliferation record, was kept out of NSG due to China’s opposition.

Strategies to Prevent Future Nuclear Fallout

• Reinforce Legal and Normative Frameworks: Strengthen existing treaties and integrate nuclear-armed states into binding regimes.
• Promote No-First Use (NFU) Doctrine Globally: NFU can serve as a confidence-building measure to prevent first-strike temptations.
   Eg: India’s NFU policy could act as a diplomatic model, contrasting with China’s ambiguity and Pakistan’s first-use threat.
• Revive Disarmament Diplomacy: Disarmament talks must be re-energised in credible international forums.
   Eg: UN Conference on Disarmament and NPT Review Conferences need actionable, time-bound disarmament goals.
• Institutionalise Crisis Communication Channels: Communication during high-stakes moments can avert catastrophic misjudgements.
   Eg: Extend the US-Russia “nuclear hotline” model to other dyads like India-China and US-China.
• Bridge Knowledge Gaps on Radiation Impact: Awareness of nuclear fallout must become mainstream to deter use by showcasing long-term consequences.
   Eg: Lessons from Castle Bravo and post-Hiroshima radiation deaths must be reintroduced to public consciousness.
• Strengthen International Legal Accountability: Build consensus to turn ICJ’s advisory opinion into binding legal doctrine.
  Eg: UN General Assembly can adopt a resolution based on humanitarian law, making use illegal under customary law.
  

Conclusion

The world has avoided nuclear war for 80 years, but this fragile peace rests on uncertain deterrence, not robust disarmament. The memory of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the unseen victims of nuclear testing demand a global movement grounded in legality, ethics, and diplomacy. A nuclear-free world is not utopia, it is a necessity for a peaceful and secure coexistence of humanity.

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