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Introduction

The US–China rivalry has moved from tariffs to technology choke points, supply-chain re-wiring, standards setting, and financial plumbing. For India, this creates risks of squeeze (market access, technology controls) and windows of opportunity (friend-shoring, investments), compelling calibrated choices.

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Impact on India’s strategic choices 

• Deeper but non-allied alignment with the US: India strengthens interoperability and tech cooperation while retaining autonomy.
  Eg: LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA in force; Malabar naval exercises; iCET (2023– ) to co-develop critical tech.
• Hardening posture vis-à-vis China: LAC crisis altered risk calculus; deterrence and border infrastructure accelerated.
  Eg: Faster BRO road/bridge build-out; telecom procurement norms that effectively exclude Huawei/ZTE from core 5G.
• Indo-Pacific centrality and minilateralism: Use coalitions to balance China and shape rules.
  Eg: QUAD working groups (HADR, critical tech, maritime domain awareness); IMEC corridor announced at G20-2023 as a BRI alternative.
• Standards and telecom choices: Avoid lock-in to Chinese tech stacks; back open architectures.
  Eg: Push for Open RAN, Bharat 6G Vision, trusted source lists for government networks.
• Critical-minerals diplomacy: Secure non-China inputs for batteries/EVs/electronics. Eg: India–Australia critical-minerals MoUs; KABIL’s lithium tie-ups in Argentina; talks with Canada on Li/Co/Ni.
• Multi-vector engagement (avoid camp-following): Keep options across West and Global South.
  Eg: Active in G20/QUAD/IMEC, yet engaged in BRICS/SCO; buys S-400 from Russia while co-producing GE-F414 engines with the US.
• Supply-chain security and maritime outreach: Prioritise resilient sea-lanes and logistics.
  Eg: SAGAR vision; logistics pacts with France, Australia, US; port connectivity with Chabahar and Duqm.

Impact on India’s economic choices 

• Selective trade strategy (de-risk, not decouple): Exit where exposure is high; sign FTAs where gains are clear.
  Eg: Walked out of RCEP (2019); concluded India–EFTA TEPA (2024) with a US$100 bn investment pledge; UK/EU FTAs under negotiation.
• China-plus-one manufacturing shift: Tariff/NTB calibration + PLI to attract supply chains.
  Eg: PLI-electronics scaled iPhone assembly; India’s smartphone exports surged; temporary laptop import licensing (2023) nudged local assembly.
• Semiconductor gambit to enter US-led chains: US controls on China open space if India builds capability.
  Eg: Micron ATMP in Gujarat; Tata–Powerchip fab at Dholera (approved 2024); design start-ups incentivised.
• Green-tech hedging (PV/RE equipment): Reduce solar import dependence on China while meeting deployment goals.
  Eg: Solar PLI and ALMM (with phased relaxations to avoid project delays).
• Critical-minerals & energy security: Lock long-term inputs for batteries and grids.
  Eg: JV KABIL in Latin America; LNG supply diversification; partnerships with Australia and Namibia for Li/REEs.
• Financial plumbing & payment resilience: Hedge against sanctions/extraterritorial risks but keep dollar access.
  Eg: Rupee trade arrangements (UAE); UPI linkages with Singapore/UAE; exploration of CBDC pilots domestically.

Conclusion

The US–China geo-economic rivalry narrows India’s policy space but also expands its strategic leverage. By pursuing multi-alignment, de-risking from China, and investing in domestic capacity and trusted tech partnerships, India can turn this global contest into an opportunity to emerge as a key stabilising and rule-shaping power in the evolving world order.

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