Answer

Introduction

China’s first trilateral summit with Pakistan and Bangladesh in Kunming on 19 June 2025 marks a significant shift in South Asian geopolitics. The gathering deepens China’s strategic foray into the region and challenges India’s traditional influence across Central Asia and the Bay of Bengal

Body

China’s Emerging Trilateral Engagements Pose Strategic Challenges to India

• Strategic Encirclement: China uses ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh to expand its maritime reach and encircle India.
  Eg. Chinese activity near Lalmonirhat, close to the Siliguri Corridor, threatens access to Northeast India.
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Expansion: China aims to link Bangladesh to the CPEC, tying it to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
  Eg. A working group to integrate Bangladesh into CPEC was formed in May 2025.
• Defence and Maritime Cooperation: China is facilitating military ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
  Eg. A per UN COMTRADE database Pakistan Exports of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories to Bangladesh was US $12.78 Thousand during 2024.
• Security Vulnerabilities: Trilateral cooperation may enable indirect support to insurgents near the India-Bangladesh border.
  Eg. Renewed defence ties could revive dormant insurgent networks in Northeast India.
• Water and Connectivity Leverage: China can influence Bangladesh’s stand on contentious issues like the Teesta river water-sharing.
  Eg. Chinese backing for Bangladesh’s Teesta project may undermine India’s leverage.
• Diplomatic Dilution of India’s Role: The trilateral forum challenges India’s influence in SAARC and BIMSTEC.
  Eg. The Kunming trilateral meets risks reducing BIMSTEC’s relevance.
• Economic Marginalisation: China is trying to dominate regional trade through infrastructure and defence deals.
  Eg. Bangladesh’s arms imports from China and involvement in CPEC weakens Indian economic influence.

India’s Counter-Strategies to Balance the Trilateral Alignment

• Engage Deeper in Bay of Bengal: India should enhance bilateral and regional ties with Bangladesh and BIMSTEC nations.
  Eg. Power exports and infrastructure in border areas support India’s Neighbourhood First policy.
• Strengthen India–United States and Quad Ties: Closer ties with the United States (US) and Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) will balance China’s power.
  Eg. India is building aircraft carriers and engaging in joint defence initiatives with Quad partners.
• Secure the Northeastern Corridor: India must secure the Siliguri Corridor and vulnerable Northeastern zones.
• Use Economic Tools Effectively: India must invest in trade, credit, and connectivity with Bangladesh.
  Eg. India continues to build roads and railways across the India-Bangladesh border.
• Upgrade Cyber and Defence Capacity: Enhancing cyber defences is key to facing new threats.
  Eg. Post Operation Sindoor, India boosted cyber security infrastructure.
• Diplomatic Balancing with Bangladesh: India can persuade Bangladesh to stay neutral in trilateral blocs.
  Eg. Bangladesh did not back a Pakistan-led proposal at the SCO due to India’s pressure.
• Teesta Water and Cultural Diplomacy: India must resolve the Teesta dispute and deepen cultural engagement.

Conclusion

India must respond to the China–Pakistan–Bangladesh trilateral with a multi-pronged strategy. Strengthening border security, advancing diplomatic engagement, expanding economic influence, and leveraging regional partnerships will secure India’s long-term strategic interests in a rapidly shifting South Asian order.

DOWNLOAD PDF