Answer

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s view on the right to vote has swung between statutory, constitutional, and fundamental frames. While Article 326 structures adult franchise, differing benches have alternately elevated or limited its status, shaping remedies and democratic protections amid evolving jurisprudence and electoral reforms

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Evolution of judicial interpretation regarding this right

• Constitutional guarantee (Article 326): Article 326 provides adult suffrage, entitling every citizen (18+, subject to disqualifications) to be registered as a voter.
• Initial judicial view: statutory right: In Kuldip Nayar vs Union of India & Ors. (2006), the Court held that the right to vote (and to stand for election) is “pure and simple a statutory right”, not a civil or fundamental right. 
• Reaffirmation of statutory status: Earlier in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982), the Court similarly described the “right to elect” as statutory, not a fundamental or common law right. 
• Recognition of democratic importance: Even while calling it statutory, the Court acknowledged voting as central to democracy; it recognized that free and fair elections are part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
• Recent shift toward constitutional status: In 2023, a five-judge bench in Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (EC selection case) described voting as a “constitutional right,” though four judges refrained from overruling Kuldip Nayar. One judge (minority) argued it should be treated as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).

Its merits recognition as a constitutional right

• Democratic core: Voting is central to democracy, a basic feature; recognition would strengthen constitutional protection.
• Article 19 link: Casting an informed vote is expressive activity; Article 19(1)(a) supports treating voting as fundamental.
• Article 21: Participation in public affairs is integral to life and dignity under Article 21.
• Remedial clarity: Fundamental status would allow direct remedies (writs) against undue disenfranchisement.
• Inclusive Political Participation: A constitutional right ensures state accountability in enabling access for migrants, urban poor, disabled voters, and remote citizens.

Factors signifying its merits don’t recognise it as a constitutional right

• High Statutory Dependence: Electoral rolls, disqualifications, delimitation, and procedures need flexible statutory regulation, not rigid constitutional entrenchment.
• Risk of Excessive Litigation: Constitutionalising voting would push every booth-level or procedural dispute to courts, overwhelming the judiciary.
• Existing Hybrid Safeguards: Essential democratic aspects (right to know, secrecy, free choice) are already protected under Article 19(1)(a) without elevating the entire act.
• Election Commission Autonomy: Full constitutionalisation may lead to judicial overreach into EC’s operational domain, disturbing institutional balance.. 

Conclusion

Given democracy’s constitutional primacy and the right’s links to Articles 19 and 21, judicial recognition of franchise as a fundamental guarantee is persuasive but must balance precedent, institutional competence, and practical consequences to avoid judicial overreach and administrative disruption. 

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