Answer

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion limiting judicial checks on gubernatorial delays marks a critical turning point for legislative federalism. By rolling back the protections articulated in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu judgment, the Court has widened constitutional ambiguity and heightened risks of Centre-State confrontation.

Body

Negative implications for India’s legislative federalism

• Weakening State Legislative Autonomy:  SC’s ruling expands the Governor’s gatekeeping power by allowing referral of any Bill to the President, even when not constitutionally required.
  Eg: A Governor may indefinitely delay an Opposition-ruled State’s welfare Bills simply by sending them to the President, creating legislative paralysis.
• Erosion of Constitutional Accountability of Governors: The verdict places trust in an unelected authority without instituting consequences for its misuse, weakening democratic federalism.
• Judicial Vacuum on Gubernatorial Overreach: The advisory opinion prohibits courts from stepping in when Governors stall Bills, removing a vital constitutional safeguard.
  Eg: Unlike the State of Tamil Nadu ruling that allowed mandamus or deemed assent, the new opinion prevents judicial correction even if a Governor withholds assent without reasons.
• Centre- States Constitutional Friction: State governments may now respond by expanding the definition of “money bills” or using delegated legislation creatively to bypass Governors.
• Erosion of Supreme Court’s Interpretive Stability: Recent changes may create unpredictability in constitutional interpretation.
• Strengthening Centralised Legislative Control: It revives a centralised vision of the Governor’s office rather than a federal one intended by constitutional practice post-1990s.
  Eg: Referring every contentious State Bill to the President effectively allows the Union executive to shape State legislative agendas.

Positive Implications for India’s Legislative Federalism

• Clearer Federal Boundaries Ahead: States may now push for precise constitutional rules defining when Governors can refer Bills to the President, strengthening structured federalism.
• Push for Assent-Process Reforms: It encourages Parliament and State Legislatures to codify timelines and procedures for assent, reducing future conflict.
  Eg: States could enact internal legislative rules mandating time-bound gubernatorial decision-making, reinforcing legislative supremacy.
• Stronger State Legislative Assertion: The ruling may prompt states to use constitutional mechanisms innovatively, within limits to protect their legislative space.
• Greater Need for Cooperative Forums: Frequent Centre–State friction over assent may accelerate calls for cooperative forums that reduce political bottlenecks.
• Stability in Federal Judicial Precedent: The Supreme Court may formalise rules preventing easy recall of federalism-related precedents after bench changes, ensuring predictability for states.

Conclusion

India must restore balance by clearly limiting gubernatorial discretion, ensuring consistent judicial interpretation, and strengthening formal Centre–State consultations. Transparent assent procedures, revived inter-governmental forums, and consensus-based lawmaking are essential to rebuild trust and safeguard a stable, predictable, and cooperative legislative federalism.

DOWNLOAD PDF