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Introduction

The expiry of the New START Treaty in February 2026 marks the end of the last major bilateral nuclear arms control pact between the United States and Russia. It signals a shift from Cold War-era cooperative restraint to renewed geopolitical rivalry in an increasingly multipolar nuclear order.

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• Shift from Bipolarity to Multipolarity: Cold War arms control reflected U.S.–USSR parity; today China’s expanding arsenal complicates bilateral limits.
  Eg: U.S. insistence that any future treaty must include China’s growing nuclear stockpile.
• Resurgence of Great-Power Rivalry: Geopolitics shows revival of territorial assertion and economic nationalism over cooperative security.
  Eg: Contemporary tariff wars and strategic posturing replacing détente-style engagement.
• Erosion of Bilateralism: START’s bilateral model is inadequate in a world with multiple nuclear stakeholders.
• Declining Trust & Verification Norms: Inspection suspensions weaken transparency and confidence-building mechanisms.
  Eg: Halted on-site inspections under New START in recent years.
• Strategic Modernisation Race: Shift from numerical reduction to qualitative weapon modernisation.
  Eg: Development of hypersonic glide vehicles and tactical nuclear systems.

Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Architecture

• Weakening of NPT Credibility: Failure of Nuclear Weapon States to pursue disarmament undermines Article VI commitments.
• Strain on CTBT Regime: Absence of binding reductions may revive incentives for nuclear testing.
  Eg: Major powers retaining testing capabilities despite CTBT’s non-entry into force.
• Legitimisation of Arsenal Expansion: Conditional restraint encourages competitive build-up.
  Eg: U.S. signalling non-adherence to limits if China expands.
• Reduced Transparency: Loss of data-sharing increases suspicion and miscalculation risks.
  Eg: End of mandated warhead and launcher data exchanges under START.
• Encouragement to Threshold States: Major-power rivalry offers justification for expansion by smaller states.
  Eg: North Korea citing U.S.–Russia competition to validate its programme.

Challenges to Disarmament Architecture

• Collapse of Incremental Reduction Model: Steady reductions since the 1980s risk reversal without a successor pact.
  Eg: Decline from 10,000+ warheads to 1,550 under New START now faces uncertainty.
• Undermining Arms Control Norms: Historic SALT → START progression toward reductions stands disrupted.
• Marginalisation of Multilateral Forums: Existing disarmament bodies already face paralysis.
  Eg: Stalled negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.
• Discriminatory Framework Debate: Perception of inequality in NPT deepens divisions without reform.
  Eg: Non-Nuclear Weapon States criticising permanent privileges of P5.
• Risk of Renewed Arms Race: No caps may trigger both numerical and technological escalation.
  Eg: Expansion of warhead numbers alongside hypersonic and missile defence systems.

Conclusion

The end of New START reflects a transition from structured bipolar restraint to uncertain multipolar rivalry. Unless reimagined on wider and more equitable terms, the weakening of verification, reduction commitments, and multilateral trust may destabilise the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

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