Introduction

UN reform, especially of the Security Council, is stalled by great‑power rivalry and veto politics. 2024 saw the most vetoed drafts since 1986, reflecting sharper US–Russia–China splits on Gaza, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions, and other respective issues.

Body

How East–West Imbalance hindering reforms in UN 

• Veto power imbalance: The five permanent members can block any decision, keeping old power rules in place even when most countries want a bigger and fairer Security Council.
• Rival reform groups: One group (G4) wants new permanent seats; another (Uniting for Consensus) opposes this. Their clash keeps talks stuck in procedures instead of real decisions.
• Distractions from current crises: Fights over Gaza, Ukraine, and Sudan spill into reform talks, leaving less time and trust to agree on big changes.

How entanglement in USA vs Russo–Chinese Alliance hinders reforms in UN

• Countering vetoes: The US, Russia, and China often veto each other’s drafts, keeping the Council stuck and reform momentum weak.
• Sanctions and monitoring clashes: Disputes over sanctions and expert panels (like on North Korea) split members, making cooperation on reforms harder.
• Control over reform talks: Big powers can slow or narrow reform negotiations, preventing concrete, text-based compromises from emerging.

What East–West confrontations enable

• Middle-ground deals: Elected members and Global South groups sometimes craft limited humanitarian or procedural fixes even amid big-power fights.
• More openness: Public debates after a veto increase pressure and visibility, which can make major powers act more cautiously.
• New options: Elected members increasingly write draft resolutions on stuck issues, adding fresh ideas and options.

What East–West confrontations disable:

• Routine UN work: Veto fights disrupt renewals of missions, monitoring panels, and accountability efforts, weakening the UN’s day-to-day effectiveness.
• Big reform deals: Bloc politics block agreement on Council size, regional seats, and veto rules, so the Council stays less effective.
• Peace missions: Disputes weaken peacekeeping and political missions by reducing resources and clarity for teams in the field.

Way forward

• Move in steps: Add elected longer-term seats, improve working methods, and promote voluntary veto restraint in atrocity cases.
• Build cross-regional deals: Align G4, African Union, and Uniting for Consensus on minimums like African representation and stronger roles for elected members.
• Use transparency: Keep post-veto debates and empower elected members to draft more texts, widening participation.

Conclusion
Progress should come through small, realistic steps. Add a few seats, clarify Council rules, and encourage voluntary veto restraint in grave crises. Build cross‑regional compromises that raise African and wider Global South voices without needing perfect, unanimous agreement.

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