Context

This Article is based on the news “Jaishankar to China: It’s in our common interest not to mass troops at the LAC” which was published in the Indian Express. China has lodged a diplomatic protest with India over the Prime Minister’s (PM’s) visit to Arunachal Pradesh, where he dedicated the newly-built Sela Tunnel to the nation. 

Sela Tunnel inauguration: China lodges Diplomatic Protest Over PM Modi’s Arunachal visit

• Inauguration of Sela Tunnel: The PM inaugurated the Sela tunnel, constructed at an altitude of 13,000 ft in Arunachal  Pradesh. 
  • It connects Assam’s Tezpur to the West Kameng district in Arunachal Pradesh. 
  • It will also ensure better movement of troops along the frontier region. 
• Chinese Objections: China claims Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet routinely objects to Indian leaders’ visits to the state to highlight its claims. China has also named the area as Zangnan.
• Rejection of Chinese Territorial Claims: India has repeatedly rejected China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that the state is an integral part of the country.

Evolution of India China Relations: A Timeline

• India China Relations – Early Years (1950s-1960s):

  • 1950: India recognizes the People’s Republic of China, and establishes diplomatic relations.
  • 1954: Signing of Panchsheel Agreement emphasizing peaceful coexistence.
  • 1962: Sino-Indian War over border disputes, China wins decisively.

• India China Relations – Post-war Scenario:

  • 1959-1962: Unilateral changes to the Line of Actual Control, leading to conflict.
  • Decades later, China claims Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part, straining ties.

• India China Relations – Strategic Distance (1970s-1980s):

  • Limited diplomatic and trade engagements due to mutual distrust.
  • India’s closeness with the Soviet Union and China’s stance against the USSR heighten tensions.
  • Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from 1978 paved the way for economic growth, and openness.

• India China Relations – Efforts for Normalization (1980s):

  • 1988: Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China marks significant advancement.
  • Agreements were signed to maintain peace along the border, Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was established in 2012.

• Post-Cold War Era (1990s onwards):

  • Economic cooperation rises as focal point, significant increase in trade and investment.

• India China Relations – 2003: 

  • Special Representatives Mechanism established to address boundary question.
    • Occasional military standoffs over regions like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

• India China Relations – Recent Developments:

• • 2017: Doklam standoff leads to significant strain.
  • June 2020: Galwan Valley Clash results in casualties on both sides, intensifying tensions.

India China Relations: Bilateral Ties

• Political: On 1 April, 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
• Economic Ties: Bilateral trade has grown significantly, reaching US$100 billion by 2022, with India becoming a large market for project exports from China.
• Cultural: India and China have a history of cultural exchanges and have established institutions like the Yoga College in China. 
• Education: India and China signed the Education Exchange Programme (EEP) in 2006 under which  government scholarships are awarded to 25 students, by both sides in recognized institutions of higher learning in each other’s country.
• Multilateral cooperation: India and China continue high-level engagement at regional fora such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS groupings reflecting common agenda for growth and development. 
• Informal Summits: Both countries have jointly advocated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
  • Both countries have initiated the “hometown diplomacy”, held two informal summits in Wuhan and Chennai respectively.

Challenges Associated with India China Relations

• Five Finger Policy: 

  • Both countries share around 3,488 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that runs along the Himalayan region, much of it poorly demarcated. 
    • China considers Tibet to be the right hand’s palm of China with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) as its five fingers.
    • An estimated 50,000-60,000 troops have been posted on either side of the India-China border in eastern Ladakh.

• Salami Slicing Strategy: 

  • Sino-Indian border skirmishes are a part of China’s larger “Salami Slicing Strategy”, wherein China is undertaking small geopolitically unlawful steps to achieve a larger gain which would have been otherwise impossible to carry out all at once.
    • China has been consistently building infrastructure in border areas including roads, bridges and model villages etc. 
      • For instance, China has constructed around  628 well-off villages along India’s borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region, understood as dual-use infrastructure for both civil and military purposes.

• Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): 

• • India opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through parts of the Pakistan occupied Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

• Aggressive Policies in the Neighbourhood: 

• • Building ports and naval facilities under String of Pearls would encircle India which would allow China to influence and control key maritime routes in the Indian Ocean.
    • String of Pearls is a geopolitical and geostrategic initiative which includes a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. Ex- Hambantota port.

• Debt Trap Diplomacy: 

  • China’s “Debt Trap Diplomacy” influences India’s relations with other countries like Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal, thereby hindering India’s neighbourhood first policy.
    • Recent change in Maldives’ stance towards India, setting a deadline for withdrawal of Indian troops from Maldives, is a consequence of its growing proximity to China.

• India’s Import Dependency: 

  • India has a trade deficit of USD 83.2 billion with China in 2022-23. 
    • Further, India’s dependency on Key Starting Materials (KSM) from China exceeds 50% for its Pharmaceutical industry.

• Water Dispute: 

  • No formal treaty has been established for the sharing of the Brahmaputra River water has been a significant source of tension with China constructing numerous dams in the upper reaches of the river on which India has raised objections.

• South China Sea and India: 

  • China claims sovereignty over part of the SCS, via the 9 dash line and its illegal creation/militarisation of artificial islands in the SCS. 
    • China’s “Nine-Dash Line” refers to a demarcation line used by the People’s Republic of China to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea.
    • China recently voiced objection to Vietnam’s invitation for India to invest in the oil and natural gas sector in the contested SCS.

Way Forward to India China Relations

• India China Border Disputes Resolution: 

  • Extra buffer zones should be established in well-known contested areas and built on existing border protocols, particularly the ban on firearms. 
    • Both nations engage in more regular dialogue at the highest levels. Both should seek to adapt the principle of “mutual and equal security” i.e., military deployments of mutually acceptable size near the border – to the reality of a heavily militarised frontier. 

• Economic Cooperation: 

  • India must focus on measures to correct the trade imbalance with China since, despite geopolitical tensions, it has huge import dependency on China.
    • India should try to facilitate the development of alternate global supply chains and diversify the imports from other countries.
    • India may also consider signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in order to boost its exports to China. 

• Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Mechanism: 

  • India needs to build and maintain a credible military deterrence capability in the mountains and the Indian Ocean. 
    • There is an urgent need to build structures and capabilities to counter Chinese grey zone threats. 
    • This should include deployment of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), introduction of Rafale jets to bolster border security, joint military exercises, etc.

• Cultural Diplomacy: 

  • India needs to promote people-to-people exchanges, harness the soft power  of culture, tourism and people-to-people ties to strengthen bilateral relations.
    • Initiatives such as student exchange programs, cultural festivals, and joint research projects.
    • Language exchange programs can also help in fostering confidence and trust among the people of both countries.

• Track Diplomacy: 

  • Encouraging non-governmental initiatives, such as track diplomacy can provide alternative channels for dialogue and help in  expanding “trust society” with “high trust” by facilitating personnel exchanges at all levels and in all fields of society. 
    • Track One diplomacy refers to formal negotiations between nations conducted by professional diplomats. 
    • Track Two diplomacy refers to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners.

• Proper Implementation of Vibrant Villages Programme: 

  • It will ensure seamless connectivity with bordering districts.
    • Vibrant Villages Programme was introduced in Budget 2023-24 for the development of villages in states bordering China, i.e., Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

• Replicating ANC to other Regions: 

• • From a larger geostrategic perspective, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) can contribute to Indo-Pacific security given China’s display of increasing belligerence in the region.
    • The ANC has proved that units of India’s three armed forces can march, sail, fly and fight “jointly” and seamlessly, under a single commander. 
    • The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is an integrated tri-services command of the Indian Armed Forces, based at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.