The 27th Pakistan’s Constitutional Amendment (PCA) marks a pivotal shift in its constitutional order, ostensibly reorganizing military command while fundamentally weakening the Supreme Court.
- By establishing a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), the executive has effectively fragmented judicial authority, challenging the core tenets of the Rule of Law and judicial independence.
About Pakistan’s 27th Amendment (PCA)- Structural Erosion of the Judiciary
- Institutional Sidelining: The PCA creates a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), stripping the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation, fundamental rights, and federal-provincial disputes.
- Fragmentation of Adjudication: By removing “landmark political case” authority (e.g., Panama Papers) from the apex court, the amendment creates a parallel judicial track more susceptible to executive influence.
- Reversing Progress: This undoes the judicial insulation achieved by the 18th Amendment, which had previously depoliticized judicial appointments.
Theoretical Underpinnings: Rule of Law vs. Executive Will
- Dicey’s Doctrine: The PCA unsettles A.V. Dicey’s Rule of Law, which views independent courts as “sentinels of rights” and the bridge between state power and individual liberty.
- Historical Parallel (Coke vs. James I): The shift mirrors the 17th-century struggle where Chief Justice Edward Coke established that the sovereign is “subject to the law”—a principle now threatened by the executive’s role in FCC composition.
- Constitutional “Hollowing Out”: Reflects a 21st-century trend where legal frameworks are rewritten not to expand rights, but to legitimize the concentration of power.
Regional Significance & Lessons for India
- Democratic Backsliding: The PCA is viewed as part of a broader “quiet dismantling” of constitutional spirits in the Global South, where democratic breakdown occurs through formally valid legal changes rather than abrupt coups.
- India’s Strategic Interest: As a neighboring constitutional democracy, India views the erosion of judicial independence in South Asia as a cautionary tale regarding institutional boundaries and executive dominance.
Conclusion
The PCA serves as a sobering reminder that constitutional survival depends on institutional restraint rather than just text. For India and the wider region, Pakistan’s judicial marginalization underscores the danger of “legalist” authoritarianism, where the spirit of the constitution is dismantled from within to facilitate executive dominance.