Recently, Telangana Assembly Speaker (Chairing the Tribunal constituted under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution) will begin hearing arguments on disqualification petitions against four BRS MLAs accused of defecting to the ruling party.
Background
- Earlier, The Supreme Court warned the Telangana Assembly Speaker is in “gross contempt” for delaying a decision on petitions filed by Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) leaders seeking the disqualification of 10 of their MLAs who shifted allegiance to the ruling party in the State.
- In July: A Bench headed by Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai had allowed the Speaker three months to complete the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
- Padi Kaushik Reddy vs. the State Of Telangana: Supreme Court also remarked that the Speaker does not enjoy constitutional immunity while acting as a tribunal under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law).
What is Defection?
- It refers to the act of an elected representative leaving the political party on whose ticket they were elected to join another party or become independent.
- Causes Instability: Defection disrupts political stability by altering legislative majorities and weakening democratic mandates.
- Undemocratic: Defection leads to instability of governments, encourages political opportunism, and erodes public trust in elected representatives.
About the Anti-Defection Law
- It was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, inserting the Tenth Schedule into the Indian Constitution.
- Objective: To prevent elected legislators from switching parties, disobeying party whips, or voluntarily giving up party membership.
- Deciding Authority: Disqualification questions due to defection are determined by the presiding officer of the respective House:
- Chairperson in the Rajya Sabha (RS)
- Speaker in the Lok Sabha (LS)
- Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
- Procedure: The presiding officer can take action on a defection case only upon receiving a formal complaint from a member of the House.
- Before reaching a final decision, the presiding officer must provide the member against whom the complaint is made an opportunity to submit their explanation.
- Grounds for Defection:
- Voluntarily Relinquishing Membership: If an elected member voluntarily gives up his membership of a political party.
- Voting Contrary to Party Direction: If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by his political party or anyone authorised to do so, without obtaining prior permission.
- Independent Elected Member: If any independently elected member joins any political party.
- Nominated Member: Becomes disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat in the House.
- He may join any political party within six months of taking his seat in the House without inviting this disqualification.
- Exception: The law provides exceptions such as mergers supported by two-thirds of a legislative party and voluntary resignation by presiding officers.
- No Time Limit: There is currently no stipulated time frame for the presiding officer to make a decision on defection cases, leading to potential delays.
- Judicial Review: The decisions of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule are subjected to judicial review.
- Role of the Speaker: Petitions for disqualification are decided by the Speaker (or presiding officer) of the respective House.
- Speaker as Tribunal Head: Under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), the Speaker acts as the quasi-judicial authority who examines, hears, and decides disqualification petitions against MLAs.
- Final Decision Authority: The Speaker/Tribunal’s decision is final within the legislature, subject only to judicial review by courts if challenged.
Amendment related to ADL: 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003
- Limit on Council of Ministers: The total number of ministers, including the Prime Minister, in the Central Council of Ministers cannot exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.
- Limit on State Council of Ministers: The total number of ministers, including the Chief Minister, in a state Council of Ministers is limited to 15% of the total strength of the Legislative Assembly, with a minimum requirement of 12 ministers.
- Disqualification from Ministerial Appointments: A member of either House of Parliament or state legislature disqualified due to defection is also disqualified from being appointed as a minister.
- Disqualification from Political Posts: Members of Parliament or state legislatures disqualified due to defection are also disqualified from holding any remunerative political position.
- Raising the threshold of Split Provision: Raised the threshold for party splits from one-third (introduced via 52nd Amendment Act) to two-thirds of members agreeing on a merger.
- This made it more challenging for small-scale defections to occur and reduced the incidence of such political manoeuvring.
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Advantages of the Anti-Defection Law
- Promote stability: The law promotes political stability by preventing frequent party-switching motivated by personal gain.
- Party Discipline: It strengthens party discipline by ensuring that members adhere to party policies on critical votes.
- Restrict Undemocratic practices: It protects electoral mandates by reducing the scope of “horse-trading” and opportunistic alliances.
- It enhances government continuity by preventing mid-term collapses of elected governments.
Limitations of the Anti-Defection Law
- Indefinite decision : There is no time limit for the Speaker to decide disqualification cases, leading to long delays and selective decisions.
- Political Bias: The Speaker’s discretionary powers may be influenced by political biases, affecting impartial adjudication.
- By-passing the law: The two-thirds merger exception creates a loophole that allows engineered defections disguised as mergers.
- Limits Opinion: The law restricts legitimate dissent by forcing legislators to follow party whips even on ordinary policy matters.
Supreme Court Judgements Relating to Anti Defection Law In India
- Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu & Ors (1993): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule and held that the Speaker’s decisions under the Anti-Defection Law are subject to judicial review.
- Review is permissible on grounds such as malafide intent or perversity of decision-making.
- Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994): The Court ruled that “voluntarily giving up membership” extends beyond formal resignation, and a legislator’s conduct can imply relinquishing party membership.
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020): The Court directed that disqualification petitions must be decided within three months, barring exceptional situations, and recommended an independent tribunal to replace the Speaker in deciding anti-defection cases.
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Recommendations to Strengthen the Anti-Defection Law
- The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) recommended that disqualification be limited to confidence motions, money bills, and the President’s address.
- The Halim Committee (1994) suggested clearly defining “voluntarily giving up membership” and imposing restrictions on expelled members.
- The 170th Law Commission Report (1999) proposed disqualification for all forms of switching and strengthening transparency in party functioning.
- The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission recommended transferring defection decisions to the President or Governor acting on the binding advice of the Election Commission.
- The 255th Law Commission Report (2015) recommended a complete overhaul of the law, focusing on member conduct rather than party affiliation alone.
Conclusion
While the Anti-Defection Law has helped curb instability and political opportunism, persistent loopholes and delays hinder its effectiveness. Strengthening neutrality, timelines, and transparency is essential for protecting democratic integrity.