Forest Governance Needs More Than Tinkering At The Edges

After the Aravalli verdict and forest governance debates, the focus has shifted to the overburdened Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) and to calls for a faster, evidence-driven administration.

Key Issues in Forest Governance

• Institutional Mismatch with Socio-Ecological Reality: Forest governance is failing because authority is concentrated in institutions whose designs do not align with socio-ecological realities.
• Colonial Design: The Forest Department was originally created by the British to extract timber for ships and railways, treating forests as state property and locals as trespassers, ignoring that the forests are human-shaped landscapes.
• Overloaded and Conflicted Role of DFO: DFO handles wildlife conflict, fire control, afforestation, forest diversion recommendations, Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA) implementation, tourism, minor forest produce (MFP) trade, welfare schemes, regulation, research and policing.
  • Many of these functions are not intrinsic to conservation and are outcomes of bureaucratic expansionism.
• Lack of Neutrality: There is a clear conflict of interest as the department acts as both the service provider (earning revenue from tourism) and the regulator (setting protection rules)
• Democratic Deficit: Treating the Forest Department as the sole authority excludes community participation, concentrates power without legitimacy, and ignores local resistance that often protects forests (e.g., Dongria Kondh in the Vedanta case, Odisha).
• Risks of Technomanagerial Reforms: Dashboards, geo-evidence and monitoring tools are treated as ‘proof of work’, but without accountability reform, they institutionalise surveillance and coercion

Way Forward

• Implement the Forest Rights Act as a Governance Framework: FRA changes the grammar of governance, not merely procedures.
  • Through Community Forest Rights (CFR), management authority shifts to gram sabhas.
  • Gram sabhas can manage production and protection, retain full MFP revenues, and handle minor disputes locally.
  • This reduces routine burden on DFOs and recasts FD as a regulator and facilitator.
  • Case Study (Gadchiroli): In Maharashtra, Gram Sabhas managed the bamboo trade, resulting in a turnover of thousands of crores, improved forest protection, and a reduction in Naxalism.
• Promote Co-management: There is a need for Joint planning by gram sabhas and FD at the landscape level.
• Gram Sabhas at the Frontline: Decision-making on forest exploitation must be led by communities, not just officials.
  • Community consent must be safeguarded against political and economic pressures.
• Downward Accountability: The focus must shift from upward accountability (to seniors) to downward accountability (to the public).
  • Accountability should be measured by whether Gram Sabha plans are included in district plans, if funds reach them directly, and if community consent is obtained for projects.
• Resource Use: There is a need to align FD spending with gram sabha needs, so that resources create direct local benefits rather than remain centrally controlled.

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Conclusion

The forest governance crisis is not due to a lack of technology or coordination, but due to authority concentrated in the wrong institutions for the wrong tasks.

• Durable reform requires revamping forest governance through community-centred decision-making under the FRA and a redefined regulatory role for the Forest Department.

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