Two weeks after Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to Russia, his first bilateral trip in the third tenure of the government, the dust from the storm it kicked up in the United States and Europe is only just beginning to settle.

Geo-Calculus Of The Moscow Visit

• The evident warmth between Mr. Modi and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, drew sharp criticism from the Ukraine President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and also a series of statements from the U.S. State Department, the National Security Adviser and the U.S. Ambassador to India, expressing disappointment.
• New Delhi has asserted its “freedom of choice” but has moved to allay concerns that anything fundamental has changed in India’s worldview as a result of the Russia visit.
• It would be a mistake, however, to assume that nothing has indeed changed, purely by examining formal outcomes. In many ways, Mr. Modi’s visit was the message itself.

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Assessment of the Conflict in Ukraine

• To begin with, the fact that the Prime Minister decided to travel to Russia two years after the war began, and not earlier, is significant.
• After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he had decided not to go for an annual India-Russia summit in 2022 and 2023, and the only public messaging revolved around Mr. Modi’s “this era is not of war” statement that he made to Mr. Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan in September 2022. 
• While the war in Ukraine continues, the nature of the conflict has changed, and Mr. Modi’s Moscow visit must be read in the context of how New Delhi sees the progress of the conflict.
• The Russian army suffered a great toll in the first two years there was a botched offensive on Kyiv; a gross miscalculation of the resilience of Mr. Zelenskyy and Ukrainian defences; the desperate attempt at a draft for Russian youth that led many Moscow elites to leave the country; massive military casualties, and questions over the efficacy of Russian military hardware against the new equipment Ukraine was being supplied by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. 
• However, today, Russia seems to be in a far better place for holding the status quo line over the area in Ukraine’s east that it occupies, and has subsequently folded into its own territory with constitutional amendments.
• As western countries now push for a “peace process”, that began with the conference in Switzerland (June 2024), New Delhi seems to have concluded that a frozen conflict is the most likely outcome.
• Any change to that status quo could only come from a massive escalation by Ukraine, requiring major new commitments of men and also military ground and airpower from its western partners.
• New Delhi also wagered, even before U.S. President Joe Biden announced that he would bow out of the U.S. Presidential race, that there is going to be a change in Washington in November – with Mr. Biden’s challenger. the former U.S. President Donald Trump, indicating a reduced commitment to Kyiv in the war, and less antagonism towards Moscow.
• If so, Mr. Modi’s visit was an acknowledgement that Russia has already weathered the worst, and that it would be pointless for India to continue its rupture of the annual summit to the detriment of bilateral ties.
• The reference in the India-Russia joint statement, of the conflict “around Ukraine” as opposed to “in Ukraine”, even seems to be a subtle acceptance of Russian claims.
• Another reference, showing “appreciation” for peace proposals “in accordance with international law and on the basis of the UN Charter”, suggests common ground between the two countries.
• India has refused to criticise Russia for the war so far, with more than 20 abstentions at the United Nations, including during the latest vote, on July 11 at the UN General Assembly, over a resolution calling on Russia to cease fire after deadly missile attacks that targeted a children’s hospital among other buildings.
• Despite meetings with Mr. Zelenskyy and a visit to India by Ukraine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, in March this year, New Delhi has hesitated on other requests from Kyiv as well – such as allowing Indian companies to provide construction, medical devices and telecom infrastructure to the Ukrainian government, or move beyond its aid of humanitarian items, thereby indicating its unwillingness to invoke Russian ire.

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Keeping Russia from China

• The geopolitical signalling of the visit extends to other spheres: by going to Moscow, days after cancelling his visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, for the SCO Summit, Mr. Modi showed that he was willing to forego a joint appearance with Chinese President Xi Jinping, but not with Mr. Putin.
• This is the reverse of western messaging, that has been calling on China to reduce its support to Russia, rather than the other way around. 
• India’s concerns about keeping Russia on-side in the face of continuing tensions with China at the Line of Actual Control remain a priority, regardless of its partnerships with western countries in the Indo-Pacific.
• The U.S.’s actions in the past few years have also given many in New Delhi cause for pause – the Biden administration has forged AUKUS (Australia-U.K.-U.S.) for nuclear submarines, engaged “Quad Plus”-countries such as New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines intensely, and during the NATO summit in Washington that was held at the same time as the Modi-Putin summit, the U.S. hosted the “AP-4” or leaders of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan.
• With its refusal to make the Quad (India, Japan, Australia, U.S.) a strategic concept, New Delhi stands in danger of limiting its utility to Indo- Pacific partners compared to these other groups. 
• It remains to be seen whether the Modi government is able to convince them to infuse new energy into the Quad on other fronts, with a Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting around the corner, and plans for a possible Quad summit later this year in New Delhi.
• In that sense, the Russia visit was not just an assertion of India’s strategic autonomy but also a reminder that India still has other options.

Geo-Economics Thrust

• Finally, Mr. Modi’s Russian journey must be considered in its ‘geo-economic’ rather than just its ‘geopolitical’ context.
• Regardless of the outcomes on the battlefield in Ukraine, it is clear that western sanctions against Russia will remain, and, consequently, so will India’s supply of discounted Russian oil as well.
• These imports have meant that India-Russia trade ties, that have hovered in the $5 billion-$10 billion range for decades, grew by 66% to a whopping $65 billion last year; this has grown a further 20% in the first quarter of 2024.
• The spurt is unsustainable unless India develops payment mechanisms for the oil imports.
• The Modi-Putin summit took many steps to address that issue, listing action-items in nine specific areas in a Joint Vision statement on trade by 2030 that appeared to make circumventing western sanctions a priority.
• In addition, the joint statement on furthering cooperation in Russia’s Far East focuses on increasing energy (oil and LNG) supplies from Russia, as well as much-needed commodities exports from India, using the yet-to-be- operationalised Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor.
• While these will help rationalise the trade imbalance, both sides will also seek mutual investments, of the kind seen when Rosneft acquired a controlling stake in the Gujarat- based Vadinar refinery (Nayara Energy), the largest foreign direct investment of its kind in India, at more than $23 billion, according to Mr. Putin.
• In turn, Indian public sector units have bought stakes in Russian oil fields to the tune of $15 billion.
• Despite the financial implications, the U.S. and Europe have steered clear of sanctioning any of these transactions, as they accept Vadinar- processed Russian oil products as “Indian- products”, and New Delhi is surmising that more such deals could be a safe proposition in the future as well.
• Russian access to the North Sea trade route around the Arctic region is invaluable as India seeks new connectivity possibilities to its east – a Trump administration is likely to double down on strictures against Iran-led connectivity routes such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar project to India’s west.
• At a time when military hardware imports, that have been the mainstay of India-Russia ties, are being reduced due to India’s decade-long diversification and Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war, such geo-economic strategies give New Delhi new levers in the bilateral relationship.
• While all such calculations could still go awry, depending on how the Ukraine war proceeds, the Russian economy struggles with sanctions, and the U.S. sets a new course post-elections, the enduring message from the Moscow visit is the solid bet the Modi government has placed on India- Russia ties.

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Conclusion

PM Modi’s Moscow visit underscores India’s strategic autonomy, balancing geopolitical, geo-economic interests, and reaffirming the significance of India-Russia ties amid evolving global dynamics.

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