The X platform’s refusal to be compelled to join the SAHYOG portal has brought to light concerns regarding the government’s control over content on the Internet.

SAHYOG Portal

• About: The SAHYOG portal, developed by the government, aims to facilitate coordination between law enforcement agencies, social media platforms, and telecom service providers for quicker takedowns of unlawful content.
• Background: This portal was disclosed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) following a directive from the Delhi High Court, which emphasized the need for a mechanism that would allow real-time interactions to address urgent issues regarding content on the Internet.
• Government’s Argument: The Sahyog Portal aids in real-time monitoring of sensitive areas to detect and prevent communal unrest.

Concerns with the Sahyog Portal

• Overreach in Regulation: The SAHYOG portal could potentially misuse its powers in attempting to curb content that may conflict with freedom of expression.
• Government Control: Critics worry that such portals could pave the way for greater governmental control over digital platforms, limiting free speech and potentially being used for political suppression.

Section 79 of the IT Act

• Safe Harbour Protection: Section 79 of the IT Act provides safe harbour protection to intermediaries, ensuring they are not liable for content hosted by third parties, provided they follow specific guidelines.
• Exception under Section 79(3)(b): However, this protection is removed if the intermediary receives actual knowledge or is notified by the government agency that content is being used for unlawful acts. 
  • In such cases, intermediaries are obligated to remove or disable access to that content quickly.

Challenges with the SAHYOG Portal

• Bypassing Section 69A Safeguards: The government’s use of Section 79(3)(b) to enable the creation of a content takedown portal like SAHYOG has raised concerns about bypassing the limited safeguards provided under Section 69A of the IT Act.
  • Section 69A: Allows content blocking only on specific grounds such as national security or public order, with procedural safeguards such as approval from a designated officer, written justification, and independent review of the blocking request.
• Multiple Agencies with Blocking Powers: SAHYOG would enable multiple government agencies, including Ministries, State governments, and local police, to have content blocking powers. 
  • This is a departure from Section 69A, which limits this power to specific authorities.
• Unchecked Censorship: There is a risk that SAHYOG could be misused for unchecked censorship, as it lacks the specific grounds and procedural safeguards that Section 69A mandates.
• Lack of Challenge Mechanisms: Under SAHYOG, there seems to be no opportunities for platforms or individuals to challenge blocking orders, unlike Section 69A, which provides review mechanisms and legal recourse for parties affected by such orders.
• Absence of Procedural Protections: The SAHYOG portal does not seem to include the procedural protections that are otherwise available under Section 69A, which raises concerns about the transparency and accountability of the process.
• Ultra Vires: The SAHYOG portal may be ultra vires, meaning it could potentially violate the legal frameworks set out for online content regulation under the IT Act.
• Shreya Singhal Case: The Supreme Court’s ruling in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) emphasized the need for safeguards when blocking content

Conclusion

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) must ensure that SAHYOG adheres to legal and constitutional safeguards to prevent the portal from becoming a tool for arbitrary censorship.

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