The recent incident in Solapur, where Maharashtra Deputy CM Ajit Pawar attempted to interfere in IPS officer Anjana Krishna’s action against illegal sand mining, has once again highlighted the deep-rooted problem of political interference in policing. 

Political Interference in Police

• National Police Commission (1979): Warned that political interference skews police career advancement toward political favour rather than merit.
• Kerala Police Reorganisation Committee (1959): Identified domination by party politics as the greatest obstacle to efficient policing.
• Punjab Police Commission (1961–62): Noted that ruling party members interfered in police functioning for unlawful purposes.
• Delhi Police Commission (1968): Highlighted political interference as a major source of corruption within the police.
• Tamil Nadu Police Commission (1971): Recorded a steady increase in political interference affecting policing over the years.

Historical Lessons

• Emergency Misuse (1975): During the Emergency (1975), the police were misused for political ends, leading to widespread excesses and curtailment of citizens’ rights.
• Anti-Sikh Riots (1984): In the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, the police largely remained mute spectators while ruling party hooligans carried out violence.
• Shah Commission Recommendations: The Shah Commission recommended an overhaul of the police system to ensure that officers could perform lawful duties fearlessly and uphold the rule of law, but reforms were never implemented.

Supreme Court Directions (2006)

• State Security Commission: The Court directed states to establish a State Security Commission to insulate the police from political pressure.
• Police Establishment Board: It mandated the creation of a Police Establishment Board to ensure transparency and autonomy in transfers and postings.
• Complaints Authorities: The Court ordered the establishment of Complaints Authorities at state and district levels to investigate police misconduct.
• Fixed Tenure for Officers: Officers at operational levels were granted a minimum fixed tenure of two years to ensure continuity and independence in their work.
• Transparent DGP Selection: It laid down a transparent procedure for Director General of Police (DGP) selection to prevent arbitrary appointments.
• Separation of Duties: The Court directed the separation of investigation from law-and-order duties in metropolitan areas for enhanced efficiency.

Reasons for failure for reforms

• Control as a Tool: The political class has been unwilling to give up its stranglehold over the police, seeing control as a tool of power.
• Resistance: The bureaucracy has also resisted change in order to maintain its dominance over police administration.
• In Paper Compliance: The reforms ordered by the Court were often complied with only on paper, with little substantive change on the ground.
• Colonial Legacy: The legacy of the colonial Police Act of 1861 continues to shape a system designed for control rather than public service.

Way Forward

• Adoption of SMART Police: The Prime Minister proposed the idea of SMART Police:  Sensitive, Mobile, Accountable, Responsive, and Techno-savvy – to modernise the force.
  • However, differences between states and the Centre over the subject of policing, which is a state subject, slowed down reforms.
    • The Centre too lacked genuine commitment, as reforms were not fully implemented.
• Ensuring Political Neutrality of Police: The police must be insulated from partisan pressures to guarantee that law enforcement remains uniform, fair, and impartial—irrespective of which political party is in power.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need to restructure, reorganise, reform, and rejuvenate the police system.

• Only a progressive, modern, and politically neutral police force that enforces the rule of law in all circumstances can support India’s developmental ambitions and ensure the vision of Viksit Bharat.

DOWNLOAD PDF