Donald Trump is expected to arrive in New Delhi for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) Summit this year.

• Fear: Speculations suggest he may push for the militarisation of QUAD.
• Interest: Analysts argue that Trump has shown limited interest in non-security domains such as HADR missions, climate change, and health.
  • However, these claims contradict the very purpose for which QUAD was envisaged.

Evolution of the QUAD

• Origins (2004): Formed after the Indian Ocean tsunami as the Tsunami Core Group for rescue and relief operations.
• 2007: Evolved into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), with joint military exercises like Exercise Malabar.
• Chinese Opposition: Led to Australia’s withdrawal, causing QUAD to become inactive.
• India’s Approach: Continued Malabar exercise with the US, later joined by Japan (2015).
• 2017 Revitalization: QUAD revived in response to China’s aggressive foreign policy under Xi Jinping.

India – China conflicts

• Border Incursions: Frequent violations across the LAC since 2013.
• 2014 Chumar Sector Incident: Chinese PLA incursions before Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Built in PoJK, further straining relations.
• Opposition to India : Blocking India’s NSG membership and supporting Pakistan in UNSC.
• Doklam Standoff (2017): 73-day military confrontation near India-Bhutan-China tri-junction.

Concerns of Other QUAD Members

• Australia: Economic coercion by China led to a shift in foreign policy.
• Japan: Increased pressure from China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.
• United States: Concerned over China’s growing Indo-Pacific influence, militarization of South China Sea, and expansionist Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

QUAD’s Strategic Shift Under Trump

• 2017: Revived as an informal grouping.
• 2019: Elevated from secretarial-level dialogue to ministerial-level meetings.
• 2021: First leaders’ summit held, now meets regularly.
• Focus Areas:
  • Security: Maritime Domain Awareness, critical technologies, cybersecurity, and supply chain resilience.
  • Non-Security: HADR, health, and climate change, maintaining strategic importance.
• Avoiding Militarisation: QUAD avoids becoming a Cold War-era NATO-style structure.
• Objectives: Maintain balance of power and ensure strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
• Risks of Militarisation: Security dilemma for China, increasing the risk of direct military confrontation. Geopolitical competition intensifies, escalating tensions. Defeats the original purpose of QUAD.
• Approach of Trump: Trump’s approach to alliances was marked by his opposition to long-term security commitments and a transactional foreign policy, as seen in his first term. 
  • He remained skeptical of multilateral obligations and was unlikely to push the QUAD towards a formal military alliance, given the financial and strategic burdens involved.

Impact of Militarising the QUAD

• Strategic Hedging: Most ASEAN countries balance their relationships between China and the US, engaging in security cooperation with the US while maintaining economic ties with China.
• Limited Strategic Flexibility: A militarised QUAD would reduce ASEAN nations’ ability to maneuver between major powers.
• Anti-China Initiatives: ASEAN countries prefer a neutral stance and are cautious about overtly anti-China frameworks.
• Appealing Structure:  The current structure ensures broader acceptability among ASEAN nations. A shift towards a security-centric model could alienate these countries, reducing the QUAD’s effectiveness.

Nature of QUAD

• Engagements: The QUAD has been actively functioning with regular engagements at various levels, including leaders’ summits, ministerial meetings, and secretary-level discussions.
• Collaborative: Multiple working groups operate across various sectors, reinforcing its collaborative nature.
• Significance: A ministerial-level QUAD meeting was held in the US one day after Trump’s inauguration, emphasizing its strategic importance even under his second presidency.
• Not a NATO-style Alliance: The QUAD lacks administrative structures or binding security commitments like NATO.
• China’s Narrative: China often labels the QUAD as an “Asian NATO” as part of its broader strategy to undermine the grouping.
• Framework: The QUAD remains an informal, flexible, and non-NATO-style structure, designed to maintain a balance of power and strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

The QUAD’s strength lies in its flexible, strategic framework, which allows it to address regional challenges without forcing its members into binding security commitments. While security cooperation will remain a key component of its agenda, full-scale militarisation would be counterproductive, undermining both regional stability and the QUAD’s broader strategic goals.

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