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Introduction

The January 2026 visit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to India, his first Asian trip since taking office marks a fundamental reorientation of Berlin’s strategy. As Germany pursues a “China plus X” policy, this engagement transcends routine diplomacy, positioning India as the central anchor of a new, multipolar “Indo-Europe” strategic framework.

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The ‘Indo-Europe’ Strategic Framework

• A New Strategic Geography: ‘Indo-Europe’ seeks to link the security and economic architectures of India and Europe into a single, cohesive space to manage global uncertainty.
  Eg: The talks focused on outlining a “new strategic geometry” that allows both powers to balance their dependencies on the US and China.
• Balancing Global Power Plays: The framework provides a “middle-path” for middle powers to preserve strategic autonomy amidst the intensifying US-China rivalry and Russia-China alignment.
  Eg: Neither India nor Europe wants to rely solely on an “inward-looking” US to manage Chinese assertiveness, prompting this bilateral “hedging” strategy.
• Resilience and Derisking: It focuses on building “resilient supply chains” and trusted technology partnerships to reduce critical dependencies on systemic rivals.
  Eg: Both leaders emphasized semiconductors and critical minerals as the “new anchors” of this Indo-European resilient space.
• Connectivity as Diplomacy: The framework views infrastructure, like the IMEC corridor, as a strategic tool for transparent and sustainable connectivity between the two regions.
  Eg: Shared backing for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) reflects a convergence on building alternative trade routes.

Issues with this Framework

• Divergent Threat Perceptions: While Europe views Russia as the primary immediate security threat, India views Russia as a vital strategic buffer against China.
  Eg: Friction persists over India’s “neutrality” in the Ukraine war and its continued dependence on Russian energy and arms.
• Regulatory and Normative Gaps: The EU’s insistence on normative standards (environment, labor, human rights) often clashes with India’s developmental priorities and policy flexibility.
  Eg: India views the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as a “protectionist tool” that penalizes emerging economies.
• Asymmetric Economic Expectations: Germany seeks deep market access in dairy and automobiles, while India prioritizes “affordable generics” and resists strict IPR norms.
  Eg: Negotiations for the India-EU FTA have remained stalled for years over these “fundamental disagreements”.
• Institutional Complexity: The “maze-like” nature of EU decision-making often pushes India toward bilateral ties, diluting the “Indo-Europe” collective vision.
  Eg: Past initiatives have often stalled due to “bureaucratic fragmentation” and overlapping institutional responsibilities in Brussels.

Potential Outcomes of Deepened Partnership

• Defence Industrial Modernisation: Germany’s emergence as a security provider offers India a chance for high-tech co-development, reducing dependence on Russia.
  Eg: The potential $8 billion deal for six next-generation submarines from ThyssenKrupp includes fuel cell technology transfer under “Make in India”.
• Economic Catalyst (FTA): A successful FTA, potentially announced at the upcoming India-EU summit, could increase EU exports to India by over 50%.
  Eg: Chancellor Merz suggested the deal could be signed as early as late January 2026 to eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods.
• Semiconductor and Digital Leadership: Collaborative efforts in AI, 6G, and semiconductors will integrate India into the global high-tech manufacturing core.
  Eg: The Joint Declaration on Semiconductor Ecosystems aims to build a trusted value chain for future technologies.
• Skilled Migration and Mobility: Systematic migration of Indian professionals will address Germany’s labor shortages while enhancing India’s human capital.
  Eg: The number of Indians in Germany has tripled to 280,000 in 2025, with new visa-free transit facilities easing professional travel.

Conclusion

The Indo-German partnership is no longer just about trade; it is about building the capacity to manage a world without norms. By operationalizing the ‘Indo-Europe’ framework through the submarines deal and the FTA, both nations can transition from being mere “norm-takers” to “norm-shapers.” This partnership is essential for a balanced, multipolar order where strategic autonomy is preserved through mutual economic and security depth.

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