Answer

Introduction

India is advancing theatre commands post-2019 with the creation of the CDS to foster jointness. In the era of multi-domain warfare, Ran Samwad 2025 underlined the need to replace 17 service-specific commands with integrated, adversary-based theatres for China, Pakistan, and maritime fronts.

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Need for Theatre Commands in Modern Multi-Domain Warfare

• Enhanced Jointness and Synergy: Unified command integrates Army, Navy, and Air Force for seamless operations.
  Eg: Creation of Andaman and Nicobar Command demonstrated tri-service integration success since 2001.
• Faster Decision-Making: Theatre commands reduce bureaucratic layers, enabling quick operational responses.
• Optimised Resource Utilisation: Pooling assets reduces duplication and ensures efficient deployment.
  Eg: 17 separate commands often overlap; theatre model reallocates resources as per threat matrix.
• Adaptation to Multi-Domain Warfare: Integration of cyber, space, and drone warfare enhances combat readiness..
• Improved Border Management: Adversary-based commands align with geographical realities of China and Pakistan fronts.
  Eg: Proposed Northern and Western Commands to streamline Himalayan and western sector defence.
• Strategic Autonomy and Deterrence: Unified structure boosts India’s independent operational capability against two-front threats.
  Eg: Strategic Forces Command under tri-service control manages nuclear arsenal effectively (Andaman and Nicobar Command).
  

Challenges in Establishing Theatre Commands

• Complexity of Restructuring Legacy Systems: Dismantling 70+ years of existing command structures faces institutional inertia.
  Eg: Transitioning from 17 commands to integrated theatres involves legal, logistical, and administrative hurdles.
• Lack of Consensus on Operational Roles: Debate persists on whether service chiefs should retain operational control.
• Resource and Budgetary Constraints: Reorganisation demands substantial financial outlay for infrastructure and technology.
• Doctrinal Divergences: Different services have distinct operational doctrines leading to disagreements.
• Risk of Increased Decision Chains: Poorly designed structures may slow rather than streamline decision-making.

Conclusion 

Kargil Review Committee and Shekatkar Committee have long recommended integrated theatre commands to address fragmented defence architecture. Their proposals include adversary-specific theatres, enhanced cyber-space integration, and clear delineation of service chiefs’ roles. Implementing these with adequate budgetary support and phased consensus-building can ensure theatreisation strengthens India’s preparedness for modern multi-domain warfare.

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