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Introduction

India’s maritime security depends not only on building more warships but also on ensuring timely combat readiness, sensor capability, and strategic alignment. Project 17A highlights persistent gaps in naval self-reliance despite significant indigenous shipbuilding progress.

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Structural Challenges in Naval Self-Reliance

• Import Dependence: Critical components like engines, radars, and sonars are still imported, delaying final combat integration despite domestic hull construction.
  Eg: Project 17A had 75% indigenous value, yet key sensors and propulsion systems remained foreign-dependent.
• Delayed Delivery: Ships are often declared complete on paper without essential combat systems, weakening operational readiness and inflating delivery claims.
  Eg: CAG flagged warships delivered without engines and sensors, leaving hulls unprepared for combat deployment.
• Design Changes: Frequent mid-construction design modifications increase costs, delay timelines, and reflect weak planning and technological standardisation.
  Eg: CAG reported hundreds of design changes in earlier warship classes during construction.
• Weak Infrastructure: Platform induction often occurs without matching dockyards, logistics chains, repair systems, and support infrastructure for sustained deployment.
• Sensor Deficit: Frigates lack premium imported radars and sonars, reducing their effectiveness as mobile sensors against submarines and regional threats.
  Eg: Chinese submarine presence rises, but Indian hulls without advanced sonar cannot effectively respond.

Measures for Operational Preparedness

• Sensor Indigenisation: Prioritise domestic development of radars, sonars, propulsion systems, and electronic warfare suites to reduce strategic delays.
  Eg: DRDO and BEL can accelerate indigenous naval sensor development under Aatmanirbhar Bharat.
• Integrated Planning: Synchronise shipbuilding with dockyard capacity, maintenance ecosystems, ammunition supply, and naval base infrastructure expansion.
  Eg: Commissioning should align with operational readiness, not just launch timelines.
• Threat Alignment: Force planning must match actual maritime threats instead of excessive focus on high-end frigates for low-intensity challenges.
  Eg: Piracy and smuggling are better addressed by the Indian Coast Guard than advanced frigates.
• Surveillance Upgrade: Strengthen the detect-decide-respond chain through satellites, underwater sensors, and coastal radar modernization before fleet expansion.
  Eg: Chain of Static Sensors built after the 2008 Mumbai attacks needs further upgrades.
• Private Ecosystem: Develop resilient domestic defence manufacturing with private sector participation and long-term procurement certainty for key systems.
  Eg: Strategic Partnership Model can support indigenous marine engines and naval electronics production.

Conclusion

Naval self-reliance is not merely shipbuilding but assured combat capability. India must align platforms, sensors, and infrastructure with real maritime threats to secure the Indian Ocean and advance strategic autonomy under SDG 9 (Industry and Innovation).

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