Prime Minister Narendra Modi will first visit Tokyo on a bilateral visit and then to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit.

• It offers a chance to impart fresh momentum to India’s partnership with Japan while cautiously advancing the normalisation of ties with China.
• This visit comes amid unexpected tensions in India’s ties with the US

Trade Dependence: US vs Russia and China

• India’s core challenge with Washington is trade-related.
• However, Russia and China provide limited trade relief:
  • Russia imported just $5 billion worth of Indian goods in 2024.
  • China imported $15 billion worth.
  • Russia ran a $60 billion trade surplus, China a $100 billion surplus against India.
• By contrast:
  • By contrast, India’s exports to the US in 2024 stood at $88 billion — more than four times the combined figure for Russia and China — and a surplus of about $45 billion in India’s favour.

Industrial Vulnerabilities to China

• Chinese Restrictions: India’s industries are dangerously exposed to China. Key examples of Chinese restrictions:
  • Rare earth magnets ban affecting India’s automobile sector.
  • Refusal to sell tunnelling equipment for Himalayan projects.
  • Chinese engineers withdrew from Apple iPhone production in India.
• Long-term neglect of industrial policy: The long term neglect means “Make in India” and “Swadeshi” campaigns won’t quickly reduce reliance.

Russia’s Oil: Changing Stance

• Initially, discounted Russian oil in 2022 was a boon for India’s energy security.
• The Biden administration once viewed India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil as a stabilising factor.
• Under Trump, it is treated as leverage to pressure India to cut ties with Moscow.
• India has become collateral damage in Russia–West confrontation.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit

• Portrayal of SCO: The SCO is often portrayed as an inner-Asian club standing up to American dominance
• Internal contradictions weakening SCO:
• • India–China tensions remain unresolved.
  • India–Pakistan disputes persist.
  • SCO refuses to censure Pakistan on terrorism due to China’s backing.
  • India does not endorse the Belt and Road Initiative.
• Pakistan’s Stance at Tianjin: Pakistan may push for dialogue with India.
  • Its diplomacy strengthened by: Improved ties with the US and the deepening partnership with China.
  • With Turkey and Azerbaijan, Pakistan’s close allies, also present at the SCO, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will have many opportunities for photo-ops and political posturing.

China’s Expanding Footprint in South Asia

• India’s Neighbours at Tianjin: India will face almost all its neighbours (except Dhaka and Thimphu) at Tianjin:
  • Afghanistan is an observer, while the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka are all associated with the SCO.
  • China is supporting Dhaka’s interest in joining the SCO forum
• Decline of SAARC: With SAARC effectively moribund (it has not had a summit since 2014), China has quietly drawn much of the Subcontinent into the SCO orbit. 
• China’s Minilateral Diplomacy: China has gone further by promoting its own minilateral formats. 
  • In Kabul, Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted a trilateral with Afghanistan and Pakistan last week. 
  • Earlier this year, China convened talks with Pakistan and Bangladesh, and it continues an informal track with Bangladesh and Myanmar.
• China as “Benign Benefactor”: China frames itself as South Asia’s “benign benefactor”, promising support for “immense development potential and resilience.”

US Counter-Strategy in South Asia

• Trump appointed Sergio Gor as US Ambassador to India and Special Envoy for South Asia which underscores USA’s  intent to compete for influence with China.

India–China Normalisation of relations

• The SCO Forum may enable discussions on border tranquility and boundary resolution.
• But expectations of major breakthroughs are unrealistic.

Japan Partnership

• Opportunities from Tokyo Visit: The Tokyo visit is expected to yield new initiatives in defence, trade, and technology cooperation.
  • India would want to enhance its independent role in Asia, creating space for expanded strategic cooperation with Japan and Northeast Asia more broadly.
• Impact of Trump’s Policies: Trump’s policies have shaken the confidence of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
  • These countries are now facing high tariffs, pressure for greater defence spending, and demands for forced wealth and technology transfers.
• Shifts in Regional Strategy: While they remain dependent on US security guarantees, they are actively seeking diversification and greater self-reliance.
  • India would want to enhance its independent role in Asia, creating space for expanded strategic cooperation with Japan and Northeast Asia more broadly.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that India’s continental ambition will remain constrained by geography and unresolved disputes with China and Pakistan. 

• In contrast, its bilateral partnerships with Asia’s maritime periphery are ripe for expansion. 
• In Tianjin, one can expect a lot of talk about changing the regional and global order, but the real progress will probably happen in India’s partnership with Tokyo.

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