The post–Cold War global moratorium on nuclear testing is weakening as the US, Russia, and China revisit their testing policies, placing India, bound by a self-imposed moratorium since 1998, in a renewed strategic dilemma.

Resurgence of Nuclear Testing

• US Signals: The United States has questioned whether its arsenal can remain reliable without physical testing.
• Russia Activity: Russia has revived infrastructure at its Arctic nuclear test sites.
• China’s Expansion: China is rapidly expanding and modernising its testing facilities at Lop Nur.
• Collapse of Nuclear Restraint: For nearly 30 years, nuclear powers respected a voluntary moratorium despite the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) never entering into force.

India and Nuclear Testing

• Sovereign Assertion: India conducted Operation Shakti (1998) to challenge the discriminatory nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and assert that unequal treaties cannot dictate India’s security interests.
• Voluntary Moratorium: India announced a voluntary halt to further nuclear testing immediately after 1998, projecting India as a mature and responsible nuclear power.
• Strategic Gains: India’s restraint helped it overcome sanctions and negotiate the 2008 India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement, enabling India’s formal entry into the global nuclear mainstream.
  • However, it is cautioned that restraint without periodic review becomes strategic inertia, and strategy must evolve when the security environment changes.

Doctrinal Pillars of India’s Nuclear Doctrine

• No First Use (NFU): India commits to not using nuclear weapons first. 
  • Nuclear weapons will be used only in retaliation to a nuclear attack on India or Indian forces.
• Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD):  India will maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to ensure credible deterrence — enough to inflict unacceptable damage, not to match other countries weapon-for-weapon.

Challenges to India’s Nuclear Doctrine

• Outdated Data: India’s current warhead designs were validated in 1998, and credibility now requires updated, data-backed validation in light of evolving threats.
• Platform Integration: New delivery systems such as Agni-5 and submarine-launched missiles (K-15/K-4) enhance second-strike capability, but their nuclear integration must be validated.
• Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) Requirement: MIRV capability demands smaller, precise, and highly reliable warheads, and India risks falling behind China and Pakistan if miniaturisation remains untested.
• Simulation Limits: Computer simulations and subcritical tests extend knowledge but cannot generate new empirical data, a limitation even the US acknowledges despite greater experience.
• Perception Matters: Deterrence succeeds only when adversaries believe India’s weapons will work, and uncertainty weakens deterrence more than the size of the arsenal.

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Way Forward

• Prepared Readiness: India must maintain technological and logistical readiness to resume testing if major powers restart nuclear detonations.
• Scientific Testing: If testing becomes unavoidable, it should be limited, underground, and aimed purely at validating new warhead designs rather than signalling power.
• Design Validation: Testing, if required, should validate MIRV-compatible and SLBM-capable warhead designs for assured second-strike capability.
• Strategic Signalling: India should clearly communicate that any test would be to maintain credible minimum deterrence, not to escalate or trigger an arms race.
• Diplomatic Shielding: India must proactively engage with partners (U.S., France, Japan, etc.) to cushion potential sanctions and preserve its responsible-power image.

Conclusion

As global nuclear restraint erodes, India must balance credibility with responsibility, maintaining testing readiness without abandoning its moral restraint, ensuring credible minimum deterrence and strategic autonomy amid shifting power equations by 2047.

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