Defence Minister Rajnath Singh refused to sign the draft statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting as the document omitted the reference to the Pahalgam terror attack but mentioned the Jaffar Express hijacking in Pakistan.

About SCO

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, international security and defence organization of ten member states. It succeeded the “Shanghai Five” grouping. 
  • Members: 
    • Founding and early members: It was established in 2001 in Shanghai by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
    • Later additions: India and Pakistan (2017), Iran (2023), Belarus (2024) – the most recent entrant
• Focus: The organization primarily focuses on regional security, counter-terrorism, and economic cooperation.
• Significance of the Group: The Group is the world’s largest regional organisation by geographical area and population.
• RATS: The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is a permanent organ of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and plays a central role in its security cooperation.
  • It focuses on countering the “Three Evils”—terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—by facilitating intelligence sharing, joint operations, and legal cooperation among member states.
  • It coordinates through joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and annual meetings among member states.
  • RATS has the status of a legal person, and in this capacity, in particular, have the right to:
    • enter into contracts; 
    • acquire and dispose of real and movable property; 
    • open and maintain bank accounts in any currency; 
    • sue in courts and participate in court proceedings.
• Shanghai Spirit: The SCO operates on the principles of the Shanghai Spirit, which emphasizes:
  • Mutual trust and mutual benefit.
  • Equality among states.
  • Respect for cultural diversity.
  • Non-aggression, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence.
  • Commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty.

India and SCO

• Membership: India was granted full membership at the Astana Summit in 2017.
• Guiding Principle: India’s participation in SCO is guided by strategic autonomy, meaning:
  • Engagement where interests align,
  • Rejection of pressure that compromises national security or core values, especially on terrorism.
• Foreign Policy: India’s foreign policy is multi-aligned, not bloc-based:
  • Engages in the SCO alongside Russia and China,
  • Simultaneously strengthens ties with Quad members — USA, Japan, and Australia.
• Strategic Significance of SCO to India: SCO provides a key platform for security cooperation, especially in counter-terrorism and regional stability.
  • It gives India economic and energy access to Central Asia, rich in oil, gas, and uranium.
• India also uses the SCO to further connectivity goals through projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking India with Russia via Iran.

Reasons for India’s Refusal to Sign the SCO Joint Statement

• Selective Mention of Terror Incidents: The draft mentioned the Zafar Express hijack in Balochistan (Pakistan). It omitted the Pahalgam terror attack in India, showing bias and lack of balance.
• Violation of the Shanghai Spirit: The selective condemnation contradicted SCO’s founding principles of mutual respect, non-interference, and equitable treatment of all member states.
• Zero-Tolerance Policy on Terrorism: India upheld its stance that “terror and talks cannot go together.”
  • It demanded decisive, non-discriminatory action against all forms of terrorism and their sponsors.
• Past Precedents: India highlighted China’s past role in blocking the UN designation of Masood Azhar as a terrorist (United Nation Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Committee), despite China’s participation in SCO’s anti-terror body (RATS).
• Anti-Terrorism Stand: India reiterated its long-held stance that “terrorism and business as usual cannot go together.” 

Significance of Rajnath Singh’s Refusal to Sign the SCO Draft Statement

• With Russia preoccupied due to the Ukraine war, China’s influence within the SCO has increased.
  • As Beijing holds the SCO chair in 2025, its geopolitical interests including support for Pakistan are more prominently reflected.
  • Rajnath Singh’s refusal signals India’s assertiveness in pushing back against China-centric or biased positions.
• India’s refusal to endorse the draft meant that, for the first time, the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting concluded without a joint statement.
• The upcoming SCO Heads of State Council meeting in Tianjin (autumn 2025) will be closely watched.

Conclusion

India’s bold position may influence the tone of future engagements and encourage a more balanced approach within SCO deliberations.

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