A Call To Renergise The Indian Space Ecosystem

The PSLV-C62 failure is not just a technical glitch but the 5th failure in seven years, indicating systemic bottlenecks in what was once India’s ‘workhorse’ launch vehicle.

• This directly hurts India’s credibility as a ‘National Space Power’ and a ‘Combat Force Multiplier’, where reliability is the real currency of space.

The Big Picture: Economy vs Space

• Economic Context: Although India is the 4th-largest economy globally, its space sector performance does not reflect its economic scale.
• Overall Gap: India is falling behind traditional space powers (the US, China, Russia, the EU, and Japan) across the entire space value chain.
  • Upstream Weakness: India lags in building large satellite constellations, limiting coverage and continuity.
  • Midstream Weakness: There is a gap in fast-paced data aggregation and processing capabilities.
  • Downstream Weakness: Revenue from space-based apps and services remains low, indicating weak commercialisation.
• Policy Concern: Excessive focus on prestige projects like Gaganyaan may be at the cost of developing the commercial space market.

Commercial Market Collapse

• Earlier Leadership: India was a global leader in small satellite launches, holding 35% market share in 2017.
• Current Status: By 2024, India’s global small satellite launch share fell to zero, indicating a complete loss of the market.

NavIC Crisis: History Repeating?

• Historical Trigger: During the Kargil War (1999), the US denied GPS data due to Selective Availability. This led India to commit to building an independent navigation system — NavIC.
• Strategic Significance of NavIC: NavIC provides independent regional navigation over India and up to 1,500 km beyond its borders, which is critical for civilian, strategic, and military applications.
• Current Status (2025): GSLV-F15 was successfully launched in January 2025.
  • However, the NVS-02 satellite suffered an anomaly and failed to reach orbit.
• Operational Shortfall: NavIC requires a minimum of 7 satellites for full regional coverage.
  • At present, only 4 satellites are functional.
  • Two satellites are nearing the end of their lives, worsening system reliability.

Three Big Bottlenecks in the Commercial Space Domain

• Slowing Launch Frequency: Commercial launches are constrained by reliability concerns and limited launch pads, reducing India’s ability to offer frequent, on-demand services.
• Satellite Production Delays: India is not manufacturing satellites at the required speed and scale, creating a mismatch between launch capacity and payload readiness.
• Orbital Slots — The Real Estate Crisis: Orbital slots and frequencies must be filed with the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) to secure usage rights.
  • The US and China have made hundreds of thousands of filings, while India is late even in filing applications, risking long-term exclusion from valuable orbital resources.

Geopolitics: China in South Asia

• Space as a Diplomatic Tool: China is using space cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy to expand influence in South Asia.
• Pakistan: China launched 4 satellites for Pakistan in 2025.
  • Chinese firm Piesat signed a $406 million deal to supply 20 satellites.
  • As a result, Pakistan cut SUPARCO’s budget by 90%, effectively outsourcing space capability to China.
• Nepal: China launched Nepal’s satellite last year, strengthening technical dependence. In contrast, a Nepalese satellite was lost in India’s PSLV-C62 failure.
• Strategic Outcome: These developments are shifting regional trust and alignment toward China, weakening India’s traditional space diplomacy advantage in South Asia.

Data Sovereignty: Are We a Digital Colony?

• Strategic Autonomy and Data Control: Strategic autonomy is impossible without data self-sufficiency, as navigation, mobility, defence, and commerce depend on digital infrastructure.
• Dependence on Foreign Platforms: Despite MapmyIndia (Mappls) being better suited to Indian terrain, most users rely on Google Maps.
  • This results in Indian data and revenue flowing to an American corporation, raising concerns of digital dependence.
• China’s Data Sovereignty Model: China uses its own Beidou GNSS, has banned Google, and ensures that strategic data remains within national control. This strengthens both technological and geopolitical autonomy.
• The Starlink Risk: India is inking deals with Starlink, a privately owned foreign satellite network.
  • Elon Musk earlier selectively denied Starlink services to Ukraine during wartime, showing that access can be politically or commercially constrained.

Case Study: Operation Sindoor (2025)

• India’s Dependence on Foreign Data: Operation Sindoor exposed India’s dependence on US/foreign remote sensing data, which was selectively delayed.
  • As a result, India lacked real-time situational awareness during critical operations.
• Pahalgam Attack, April 22: China provided 129 satellite images to Pakistan (Jan 1–Apr 27), which enabled precise operational planning for the attack.

The ELINT Gap (Electronic Intelligence)

• About ELINT: ELINT involves detecting enemy radars and radio signals to track aircraft and military assets.
• India’s Status: India’s first ELINT satellite is still experimental.
  • There is no funded roadmap for formation flying, which is essential for operational ELINT constellations.
• China’s Capability: China has 170+ ELINT satellites across 15 constellations. These reportedly helped Pakistan identify IAF aircraft during Operation Sindoor and have given the adversary tactical superiority.

Organisational Flaws: Silos vs Integration

• India’s Military Space Structure: The Defence Space Agency (DSA), established in 2019, remains a lower-ranked and inadequately empowered body, often manned by non-specialists, which limits strategic planning and operational effectiveness
  • The Army, Navy, and Air Force continue to operate in silos, resulting in weak jointness and poor integration of space capabilities with cyber and conventional military operations.
• Global Practice: The US, China, and Russia have separate Military Space Forces.
• Pakistan: Space Command under the Air Force, integrated with Cyber Command, fully functional by 2024.

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The Numbers Game: Strategic Asymmetry

• Budget Disparity: China’s defence budget is three times India’s.
• Launch Disparity:  China conducts ten times more satellite launches than India.
• Remote Sensing Capacity (2024): China has 396 remote sensing satellites.
  • India’s SBS-III programme targets only 52 satellites by 2030, and just one defence satellite was launched between 2023 and 2025.

Counter-Space Threats to Indian Assets

• Jamming: During the Galwan standoff, Chinese ground systems in Tibet/Xinjiang jammed Indian satellites.
• Stalking and Manoeuvres: Chinese satellites conduct close-proximity manoeuvres near Indian assets. This further threatens India’s already limited satellite fleet.

Way Forward

• Atmanirbharta as Strategic Necessity: Self-reliance in military space is not optional but essential for national security.
• Avoiding “Sindoor 2.0”: Unless institutional accountability is fixed, future operations will continue to suffer from intelligence and capability gaps, making repeat failures likely.
• Interim Capability Bridging: If indigenous capacity cannot scale quickly enough, India should procure foreign satellites, but they must be owned and operated under the Indian flag, not on a rental or service-based model.
• Strategic Accountability: There must be time-bound responsibility on ISRO and defence agencies to deliver operational military space capabilities, with clear milestones and outcome-based oversight.

Conclusion

Without revitalising launch reliability, satellite manufacturing, and military integration, India’s space programme will remain a strategic weak link despite economic strength.