Parliamentary Democracy

Context: 

Recently,  a new Parliament building was inaugurated. However, there is an overlooked fact: the increasing subordination of the Parliament in India’s parliamentary democracy.

Idea of Parliamentary democracy: 

• The Constitution of India states that the Executive branch of the State (Council of Ministers) shall be collectively responsible to the Legislature (House of the People). 
• This implies that Parliament should oversee the work of the government and hold it responsible for its actions and omissions. 
• Members of Parliament also have the responsibility of passing laws, authorising the expenditure of the government, and representing the interests of their constituencies.

Instruments of Parliamentary control over the Executive:

• Tools of legislative oversight 
  • Question Hour: MPs can ask Ministers starred questions (oral answers, with follow-up questions), or unstarred questions (written answers). The first hour of each day is reserved for Questions.
  • Zero Hour: MPs can raise issues that are of public importance under rule 377; Ministers give them written responses. They can also “call attention” to important issues, which are debated.
  • Adjournment Motion: An MP can give a notice to defer the normal business of the house and discuss an issue on a matter having serious consequences. Ministers reply to the motion and there is a vote.
  • Other tools: Half-an-hour discussion, short duration discussion, calling attention motion, no-confidence motion, censure motion, and other discussions.

• Financial oversight through Budget Approval: All government expenditure (except a few items specified in the Constitution) need to be sanctioned by the legislature. 
  • This is usually done as part of the annual budget process. Additional expenditure may also be sanctioned through supplementary demand for grants.

• Scrutiny through Committees: The Committees look into the demands for grants of Ministries/departments, examine Bills pertaining to them, consider their annual reports, and look into their long-term plans and report to Parliament.

Dilution of legislative oversight: 

• Reduction in the average of annual sitting days: 
  1. As per decadal data furnished by PRS Legislative Research, the average of annual sitting days dropped from a high of 127 days during 1952-1960, to 77 days for 1991-2000 and to 64 days in 2011-20. 
  2. The average for the last two years is 58 days. 
  3. The 15th Lok Sabha (2009-2014) was scheduled to sit for 606 days but the actual sitting was just 357 days with 51 per cent of time lost due to adjournments. 
  4. The 16th Lok Sabha (2014-2019) had a scheduled sitting of just 337 days over a five-year period.

• Lack of intra­-party dissent: 
  • The possibility of intra­-party dissent within Parliament has been stamped out by Anti­ Defection Law as it penalises disobedience of the party whip with disqualification from the House altogether.

• Weakened opposition in the House:
  • The Indian Constitution did not carve out any specific space for the political Opposition in the House.
  • There is no equivalent, for example, of Prime Minister’s questions, where the Prime Minister has to face direct questioning of their record from the Leader of the Opposition as well as by other politicians. 
  • The manner of proceedings in Parliament are under the complete control of the executive, with no real constitutional checks upon how that control is exercised.

• No Independence of the Speaker’s post
  • The Speaker is not required to give up membership of their political party, and is not constitutionally obligated to act impartially.
  • This has led to an increasing trend, at both the central and the State levels, of Speakers acting in a blatantly partisan manner in order to advance the interests of the executive over the interests of the House.
  • When the ruling party wishes to avoid effective scrutiny in the Rajya Sabha over Bills, the Speaker simply classifies the Bill as a “money bill”, thus depriving the Rajya Sabha of the right to make amendments. Ex- Aadhar Bill.

• Role of the Upper House: 
  • The role of the Upper House is undercut not only by the Speaker’s misclassification of Bills but also by the constitutionally sanctioned ordinance making power. 
  • Ordinances are used as a parallel process of law making, especially when the executive wants to bypass the Upper House altogether.

• Other issues:
  1. The healthy practice of referring bills to parliamentary committees has dropped sharply in the recent past — from a high of 60 per cent to just 23 per cent in the current Lok Sabha.
  2. The Finance Bill is introduced on Budget day. On the final day when this Bill is to be passed, several important clauses are added and passed by Parliament without any discussion or debate. For example- In 2023, an entire chapter relating to GST tribunals was added and approved on the last date without any debate or discussion

Constitutional changes and reforms needed:

• Putting safeguards in place against executive dominance or abuse:
  • In order to enact its agenda, the executive must command a majority in Parliament. 
  • This opens up the space for intra­party dissent, and an important role for ruling party parliamentarians — who are not members of the cabinet to exercise a check over the executive.

• Enhanced role for the opposition: The Opposition should be granted certain rights in Parliament, and certain limited control over parliamentary proceedings, in order to publicly hold the executive to account.

• Recommendations of the N. Venkatachalaiah Commission on strengthening the role of the Legislature: 
  • To establish new committees on the Constitution, National Economy and Legislation
  • To plan legislation in a more systematic manner so that major social and economic Bills are circulated for public discussion
  • To control the treaty power of government.

News Source: The Hindu

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