GS III: Security challenges and their management
Context: India must strengthen its conventional missile capabilities by establishing a Rocket Force, enhancing long-range precision strike capabilities, and modernising its missile doctrine to counter China’s growing missile superiority below the nuclear threshold.
China’s Missile Advantage
- Missile-Centric Warfare: China increasingly views conventional missiles as instruments of both political coercion and warfighting, enabling strategic objectives without triggering full-scale war.
- Large Missile Inventory: China has reportedly deployed over 200 conventional missile launchers opposite India, providing substantial conventional strike capability.
- Strategic Missile Bases: The Korla and Kunming missile bases can launch DF-15B, DF-16, DF-21C and DF-26 missiles against Indian military and strategic targets.
- Hypersonic Capability: China’s DF-100 and CJ-1000 hypersonic missiles can strike deep targets with minimal warning, posing major challenges for India’s air defence.
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India’s Existing Vulnerabilities
- Limited Missile Inventory: India’s long-range conventional missiles, including Agni, BrahMos, and Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM) – Nirbhay, are still under expansion and integration.
- No Dedicated Rocket Force: India currently lacks an integrated Rocket Force capable of conducting coordinated conventional missile operations.
- Targeting Constraints: India’s real-time intelligence, target acquisition and battlefield surveillance capabilities remain limited for long-range missile warfare.
- Hypersonic Gap: India’s hypersonic missile programme is still under development, while China has already inducted operational systems.
- Geographical Disadvantage: The Himalayas reduce India’s missile detection and response time because Chinese missiles are launched from the Tibetan Plateau, whereas Indian missiles must traverse mountainous terrain.
Need for an Indian Rocket Force
- Strategic Deterrence: A dedicated Rocket Force would establish mutual vulnerability, discouraging China from initiating a conventional missile campaign.
- Deep Strike Capability: India should be capable of targeting the PLA Western Theatre Command (WTC) and strategic military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang.
- Operational Disruption: The Rocket Force should target roads, railways, airbases, logistics hubs and other military infrastructure supporting Chinese operations.
- Battlefield Support: The force should enable strikes against PLA camps, artillery positions and ammunition depots during tactical operations.
- Unified Command: Strategic, operational and tactical missile operations should function under a single command authority.
Doctrinal Reforms
- Counter-Value Strategy: India should incorporate counter-value conventional strikes alongside its existing counter-force approach.
- Unified Target List: A common national target database should replace service-specific targeting to enable rapid missile operations.
- Pre-Delegated Authority: The Rocket Force should receive pre-designated launch authority for time-sensitive strikes during the opening phase of conflict.
- Structural Reforms:
- CDS Leadership: The proposed Rocket Force should function under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) instead of individual military services.
- Missile Expansion: India should expand its inventory of Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and advanced Agni variants.
- Hypersonic Development: Accelerated development of indigenous hypersonic missiles is essential to maintain credible deterrence.
Technological Reforms
- Private Sector Participation: Greater involvement of the private defence industry is needed alongside the DRDO to accelerate missile production.
- Research & Development: Increased investment is required in advanced propulsion systems, semiconductors, high-performance materials and indigenous missile technologies.
- Supply Chain Security: Reducing dependence on imported high-end defence components is essential for strategic autonomy.
Interim Measures
- Airbase Hardening: The Indian Air Force (IAF) should disperse aircraft and strengthen airbase protection against missile attacks.
- Integrated Air Defence: Optimise deployment of air defence systems to reduce vulnerability of critical infrastructure.
- Long-Range Precision Strikes: Expand India’s conventional long-range strike capabilities to create reciprocal deterrence.
- Space-Based Surveillance: Strengthen satellite surveillance, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and tracking systems to detect mobile missile launchers.
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Challenges
- Policy Gaps: India’s Rocket Force remains largely a conceptual proposal without an established organisational framework.
- Industrial Constraints: Missile production continues to face delays, cost overruns and technological bottlenecks.
- Technology Deficit: Gaps remain in hypersonic technology, advanced electronics, targeting systems and real-time intelligence.
- Limited Missile Stocks: India’s conventional missile inventory remains smaller and less diversified than China’s.
Way Forward
- Establish Rocket Force: Create an integrated Rocket Force under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with unified operational command.
- Strengthen Missile Doctrine: Develop a comprehensive doctrine integrating counter-value, counter-force and deep precision strike capabilities.
- Expand Indigenous Production: Increase investment in DRDO, private industry, advanced manufacturing and defence R&D.
- Enhance ISR: Improve satellite reconnaissance, early warning systems, battlefield surveillance and network-centric warfare capabilities.
- Build Credible Conventional Deterrence: Develop sufficient missile capability to impose unacceptable costs on adversaries while remaining below the nuclear threshold.
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Conclusion
India’s future military preparedness requires a credible Rocket Force, integrated missile doctrine, enhanced long-range precision strike capability, and stronger indigenous defence manufacturing to establish mutual conventional deterrence against China’s expanding missile arsenal.
30 Jun 2026
