The Cabinet Mission of 1946: A Last Attempt for a United India

In February 1946, the Attlee government made a significant announcement, deciding to dispatch a high-powered mission consisting of three British cabinet members—Pethick Lawrence (Chairman of the mission and Secretary of State for India), Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade), and A.V. Alexander (First Lord of Admiralty) to India. The mission aimed to explore ways for a negotiated and peaceful transfer of power to India.

Reasons for the Imminent British Withdrawal

The success of nationalist forces in establishing hegemony became apparent by the war’s end. Nationalism had permeated previously untouched sections and areas.

• Evolving Bureaucratic Landscape: There was a growing demonstration of support for nationalism within the bureaucracy and loyalist sections. The scarcity of European recruits for the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the policy of Indianisation had dismantled British dominance in the ICS by the First World War. 
  • By 1939, a British-Indian parity existed. The prolonged war had led to weariness and economic concerns, leaving only a depleted, war-weary bureaucracy impacted by the events of 1942.
• The British strategy of combining conciliation and repression exhibited limitations and contradictions.
  • Limits of Conciliation: Following the Cripps’ Offer, there was little left for conciliation except the grant of full freedom.
  • Government’s Use of Force: The use of force to suppress non-violent resistance exposed the naked power behind the government. 
    • If the government did not crack down on ‘sedition’ or offered a truce, it appeared incapable of wielding authority, leading to a decline in prestige.
  • Policy Dilemma and Loyalist Concerns: Efforts to win over Congress dismayed the loyalists, creating a policy dilemma for the services, which still had to be implemented. 
    • The potential of Congress ministries assuming power in the provinces intensified this dilemma.
• Congress rule proved to be a significant morale-booster, fostering a deeper penetration of patriotic sentiments among the masses.
• Demands for leniency towards INA prisoners within the Army and the revolt of the RIN ratings raised concerns about the armed forces’ reliability if Congress initiated a mass movement similar to 1942, this time with support from provincial ministries.
• The only alternative to an all-out repression of a mass movement seemed to be entirely official rule, an impractical scenario due to the lack of necessary numbers and efficient officials.
  • The government recognized the necessity of a settlement to bury the specter of a mass movement and ensure positive future Indo-British relations.

The primary objective of British policymakers now was to orchestrate an elegant withdrawal following an agreement on the specifics of power transfer and the character of post-imperial relations between India and Britain.

On the Eve of the Cabinet Mission Plan

Congress’s Stance on the Cabinet Mission Plan: On the verge of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Congress insisted on power consolidation in a single center, proposing that the concerns of minorities be addressed within a framework ranging from autonomy in Muslim-majority provinces to self-determination or secession from the Indian Union, albeit after the departure of the British. 

• British Policy Shift in 1946: The British, aiming for a united and amicable India, sought an active partner in Commonwealth defense, emphasizing that a divided India would compromise defense capabilities and tarnish Britain’s diplomatic standing. 
  • In 1946, British policy distinctly favored a united India, deviating from previous stances. 
• Prime Minister Clement Attlee, on March 15, 1946, asserted the impossibility of allowing a minority to obstruct the progress of the majority, a departure from the Shimla Conference where Jinnah had the latitude to disrupt proceedings. 

Cabinet Mission Arrives

When the Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi on March 24, 1946, discussions ensued with leaders from various Indian parties on 

• the interim government and 
• the principles and procedures for drafting a new constitution for an independent India. 

Failing to reach a consensus on the fundamental issue of India’s unity or partition by Congress and the League, the mission proposed its plan in May 1946.

Cabinet Mission Plan—Main Points

The rejection of the demand for a full-fledged Pakistan was based on several grounds:

• The proposed Pakistan would encompass a substantial non-Muslim population—38 percent in the North-West and 48 percent in the North-East.
• The principle of communal self-determination would potentially lead to the separation of Hindu-majority western Bengal and the Sikh- and Hindu-dominated Ambala and Jalandhar divisions of Punjab. 
  • Some Sikh leaders were already advocating for a separate state if the country underwent partition.
  • The partitioning of Bengal and Punjab would disrupt deep-seated regional ties.
• The act of partitioning would give rise to economic and administrative challenges, such as the communication problem between the western and eastern parts of Pakistan.
  • Dividing the armed forces was considered perilous and posed a threat to national security.

• Grouping of existing provincial assemblies into three sections:
  • Section-A: Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, United Provinces, Bihar, and Orissa (Hindu-majority provinces)
  • Section-B: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, and Sindh (Muslim-majority provinces)
  • Section-C: Bengal and Assam (Muslim-majority provinces)
• Form of Government: It recommended a federal government, three-tier executive, and legislature at the provincial, section, and union levels.
• Election of a constituent assembly by provincial assemblies using proportional representation, with voting in three groups—General, Muslims, and Sikhs. 
  • The Members of the Constituent Assembly from the Provinces were elected by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies. 
  • The constituent assembly would consist of 389 members, with 292 from provincial assemblies, 4 from chief commissioner’s provinces, and 93 from princely states.
• Constituent Assembly Seating Arrangement: Unique seating arrangement in the constituent assembly, with members from groups A, B, and C sitting separately to decide the constitution for provinces. 
  • Subsequently, the entire constituent assembly, comprising all three sections (A, B, and C combined), would convene to formulate the union constitution.
• Proposed Federal Structure: Establishment of a central authority to oversee defense, communication, and external affairs, with a federal structure proposed for India.
  • Resolution of communal questions in the central legislature through a simple majority vote of both communities present and voting.
  • Granting full autonomy and residual powers to the provinces.
• Liberation of princely states from the paramountcy of the British government, allowing them the freedom to engage in arrangements with successor governments or the British government.
• Provision for provinces to exercise the option of withdrawing from a group after the first general elections. 
  • Additionally, after 10 years, a province would have the freedom to request a reconsideration of the group or the union constitution.
• Formation of an interim government from the constituent assembly during the transitional period.

Distinct Perspectives on the Grouping Clause

The interpretation of the plan varied among different parties and groups, each examining it through its unique lens.

• Congress: The Congress perceived the Cabinet Mission Plan as contradictory to the formation of Pakistan, emphasizing the optional nature of grouping, the envisioning of a single constituent assembly, and the elimination of the League’s veto power.
• Muslim League: The Muslim League, on the other hand, inferred the compulsory nature of grouping as indicative of Pakistan.
  • It was clarified later by the Mission that grouping was indeed compulsory.)

Main Objections

Various political parties raised objections to the Plan based on their distinct concerns.

Congress

• Provincial Autonomy: Provinces should not be compelled to remain in a group until the inaugural general elections; they should have the freedom to abstain from joining a group initially. 
  • This was particularly relevant to the Congress-ruled provinces of NWFP and Assam, placed in groups B and C, respectively.
• Mandatory grouping contradicts the repeated emphasis on provincial autonomy.
• The absence of provisions allowing elected members from the princely states in the constituent assembly, limiting their inclusion to nomination by the princes, was deemed unacceptable.

League

• Grouping should be obligatory, with sections B and C evolving into cohesive entities, preparing for potential future secession into Pakistan.

The League had anticipated that the Congress would reject the plan, prompting the government to invite the League to establish the interim government.

Acceptance and Rejection

On June 6, the Muslim League and, later, on June 24, 1946, the Congress both endorsed the comprehensive plan presented by the Cabinet Mission.

• Subsequently, elections were conducted in provincial assemblies in July 1946 to establish the Constituent Assembly.

• Nehru’s Declaration on Constituent Assembly Sovereignty: On July 10, 1946, Nehru declared, “We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly,” implying the Assembly’s sovereignty in determining procedural rules. 
  • He also hinted at the likelihood of no grouping, citing objections from NWFP and Assam about joining sections B and C.
• Muslim League’s Response: However, on July 29, 1946, the League retracted its acceptance of the long-term plan following Nehru’s statement. 
  • In response, they issued a call for “direct action” starting from August 16 to pursue the creation of Pakistan.

Conclusion

The Cabinet Mission’s plan represented a complex effort to balance diverse Indian interests with British objectives for a peaceful transfer of power. Despite initial acceptance by both Congress and the Muslim League, disagreements over key provisions, particularly on provincial autonomy and the grouping clause, led to a breakdown. This impasse set the stage for heightened tensions, ultimately influencing the trajectory toward India’s partition and independence.

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